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EFFECTS OF LINEAR AND NON-LINEAR INCENTIVE PAY SYSTEMS
WITH INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PAYOUTS ON THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY PHENOMENON OF SOCIAL LOAFING
Deloves A. Tinley Smoot, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 1997
The purpose of the present study was twofold. First, the experiment
investigated the occurrence o f social loafing behavior when individuals are engaged in a
production task. Social loafing is defined as a decrement in individual performance
when working co-actively with a group. Second, the experiment compared the
effectiveness o f three incentive pay systems (linear, positively and negatively
accelerating) in eliminating social loafing behavior and in generating performance levels
higher than those generated by a flat or hourly pay system.
Sixteen undergraduate students, all female, participated in twenty-five 15minute work sessions in which they made widgets from pop beads. Subjects were
paid based on their productivity during each session, received $10.00 for participating
in a debriefing session and a $15.00 bonus for completing the study. Using a withinsubject design, subjects were exposed to four pay conditions: (1) flat individual, (2)
flat group, (3) incentive individual, and (4) incentive group.
The absence of statistical significance between mean productivity during the flat
individual and group conditions indicated that social loafing did not occur. However,
given seven subjects produced fewer widgets during the flat group condition, some
degree o f performance decrement was observed. This decrement was eliminated by the
incentive pay systems.
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A systematic relationship between pay and productivity emerged in that the
incentive pay systems generated higher levels of performance than did the flat pay
systems. In addition, the incentive pay systems differentially affected performance
levels and cost-per-widget. These findings suggest that it was not the size o f the
incentive which controlled performance, but rather the fact that there was a pay-forperformance contingency in place.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Management of individual performance is critical to the effectiveness o f
organizations (Gilbert, 1978; Lawler, 1990) and to the survival o f United States
business and industry in the world market (Blinder, 1990). Considering that labor
costs can account for 60-80% o f an organization’s total operating costs (Blinder, 1990;
Perry, 1988), the ability to manage performance improvements and to maintain
consistent performance over time may well determine an organization’s success or
failure.
Individual performance impacts more than the immediate organization. The
United States’ current economic position, prompted by the reduction in the average
annual productivity growth rate and a decline in the competitiveness of U.S. industries
in the world market (Blinder, 1990; Grayson & O'Dell, 1988; Lawler, 1990) is good
reason to consider performance management an urgent issue.
From 1973 to 1988 output per worker-hour in all U.S. businesses grew at a
paltry compound rate o f 1.05 percent a year. That is barely more than a third o f
the growth rate we enjoyed during the halcyon 1947-73 period (2.96 percent a
year) and, more important, only about half our long-term historic average
(Blinder, 1990, p. 1).
With respect to competitiveness in the world market, the United States’ average
productivity growth between 1960 and 1980 was 2.7% compared to 9.3% for Japan
during the same time period (Mainstone & Levi, 1987).
This downward trend in productivity growth rate does not merely affect
America’s economic standing in the world market, it produces an adverse impact on the
living standards o f all U.S. citizens. Blinder (1990) eloquently addressed this point*
1
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I f our productivity growth rate remains so depressed for a protracted period of
time, America is destined to slip into the second rank o f nations in terms o f
wealth and income, just as the United Kingdom did before us. To most
Americans, that is a distasteful prospect (p. I).
Solutions to Productivity Problems
Monetary Incentives
Recent efforts to improve productivity and to place America in a more favorable
economic position have found companies increasingly turning to group monetary
incentive systems and team work as possible solutions. The popularity of the incentive
pay system concept in business and industry is evidenced, in part, by the frequent
occurrence o f articles on the subject in compensation, personnel and management
periodicals and the popular press (e.g., Kerr, 1996; Kopelman, 1983; Milkovich,
1992; Ritzky, 1995; Skryzcki, 1987). A 1987 survey conducted by the Hays Group
indicated that 37% o f the organizations surveyed use some sort o f profit sharing plan,
16% use group incentives and 15% use gain sharing plans. Profit sharing plans,
designed to enhance productivity by linking worker pay to the profitability o f the
organization, and gain sharing plans, designed to motivate greater performance by
promising bonuses to workers based on money saved, are gaining popularity (Blinder,
1990; Lawler, 1990; Perry, 1988; Skryzcki, 1987; Weitzman & Kruse, 1990).
According to Agnew, Dickinson, Acker, and Cronin (1992), such incentive
plans are only marginally effective at changing organizational behavior because they
violate a basic behavioral principle relevant to pay-for-performance. As specified by
Bijou and Baer (1978) and Frederiksen (1982), to derive the greatest benefit from
monetary incentive systems money should be delivered contingent upon clearly defined
individual behavior and as soon after the behavior as possible. Agnew et al. (1992)
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suggest that individual incentive systems, defined as “systems involving the timely
delivery of money contingent upon individualized, overt work performance” (p. 1),
conform to this behavioral principle and, therefore, ate better at managing and
maintaining performance improvements over time. Lawler (1990) supports this
position in suggesting that a good monetary incentive system is one that focuses on
immediate rewards for individual performance. Thus, one weakness of profit sharing,
gain sharing and lump-sum bonus pay plans is the considerable (e.g., delivered
annually) delay in the delivery o f the money incentive.
Blinder (1990) has suggested the “l/n problem”, where “n” represents the
number o f workers covered by the incentive pay plan, accounts for another weakness
o f profit sharing and gain sharing plans. In such group-based incentive systems, the
amount of incentive earned by any worker is dependent upon the performance o f the
group collectively.
Lawler's (1990) concept o f “line of sight or line o f influence” supports
Blinder's (1990) contention. When pay is contingent upon performance, the individual
should be able to directly influence his or her pay through performance. In other
words, the power o f the pay-performance contingency to motivate individual workers
to work more and work better is dependent, in part, upon the extent to which individual
workers can control pay levels as a function o f their own behavior.
Monetary incentive pay systems conforming to the requirements specified by
Agnew et al. (1992) and Blinder (1990) have been effective in managing worker
productivity in the laboratory (e.g., Agnew et al., 1992; Berger, Cummings, &
Heneman, 1975; Dickinson & Gillette, 1993; Farr, 1976; Frisch & Dickinson, 1990;
Johnstone, Trefsgar, Berg, Kaufman, Jones, Roberts, Leary, & Duncan, 1989; Leary,
Roberts, Trefsgar, Kaufman, Cassal, Jones, McKnight, & Duncan, 1990; London &
Oldham, 1976; Oah & Dickinson, 1992; Riedel, Nebeker, & Cooper, 1988; Pritchard,
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Leonard, Von Bergen, & Kirk, 1976; Smoot & Duncan; 1997; Stoneman & Dickinson,
1989) and in applied settings (e.g., Abernathy, Duffy, & O’Brien, 1982; Bushhouse,
Feeney, Dickinson, & O’Brien, 1982; Dierks & McNally, 1987; Dickinson, LaMere, &
Biby, 1991; Gaetani, Hoxeng, & Austin, 1985; George & Hopkins, 1989; Nebeker
& Neuberger, 1985; Yukl & Latham, 1975; Yukl, Latham, & Pursell, 1976). A
general finding among these studies is that workers tend to perform at higher levels
when they are paid for what they produce as opposed to being paid a flat hourly rate or
salary. When pay is tied to performance and workers know there is a direct
relationship between their productivity and their pay level, individual performance is
better.
Investigations o f the performance-pay contingency have analyzed such factors
as pay curve design, percentage o f incentive pay, incentives combined with feedback,
incentive versus flat or houriy pay, group versus individual payout conditions and
group size. The most basic research on individual monetary incentives has focused on
incentives versus hourly pay. George and Hopkins (1989) demonstrated that the
performance o f waitpersons could be greatly improved with incentives while
controlling labor costs. Waitpersons were paid 7% o f their gross sales. Gross hourly
sales increased substantially and given that the incentive was paid from proceeds from
increased sales and given that increased profits exceeded the increased labor costs, the
benefits o f the incentive pay system outweighed the costs.
Percentage o f Incentive fay to Base Pav
The most recent efforts to pinpoint the essential features of effective incentive
pay systems have focused on percentage o f incentive pay to base pay. Specifically,
these studies have sought to answer the question “what is the appropriate mix of base
pay and incentives?” In a laboratory simulation Riedel et al. (1988) employed a
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between-subjects design to investigate the effects of monetary incentives on goal
choice, goal commitment and task performance. Subjects were assigned to one of
seven groups-two control and five experimental. The control groups were
distinguished in that one group was given a minimum performance standard
requirement in order to receive the hourly wage while the other group was n o t Five
levels o f the independent variable, incentive percentage, defined the five experimental
groups where subjects worked in groups paid one of five percentage levels • 25%,
50%, 75%, 100% or 125% o f their base hourly wage of$4.40. To illustrate how the
base wage and incentive percentage were delivered, a subject in the 125% group would
receive $4.40 base pay for the hour plus $5.50 incentive pay when performance
exceeded the minimum standard.
The laboratory simulation was characterized by four design factors. First, the
performance task o f transferring questionnaire data on to scanning forms is very much
like scanning tasks performed by employees of financial institutions. Second, subjects
were required to work a typical half-time work schedule - five days, four hours per day
for a total o f twenty work hours. Third, subjects worked in rooms resembling actual
offices. Fourth, a break area was available to subjects where they could interact with
other subjects and where they could consume refreshments.
The hypothesis that subjects in the incentive groups would perform better than
subjects in the non-incentive groups was supported. An analysis o f variance revealed a
significant difference ( q<.001) between the mean performance o f control groups and
incentive groups. However, the differences between the performance means of the five
incentive groups were not significant. Therefore, the 25%, 50%, 75%, 100% and
125% incentives did not affect performance differentially.
An interesting aspect of this study is that Riedeletal. (1988) fail to attribute the
task performance differences between the control and experimental groups to the
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functional relationship between incentive pay and performance. Rather, the
researchers’ explain the effects as a function o f mediating variables typically found in
"expectancy models” o f human behavior. However, the fact remains that performance
levels were significantly better for subjects receiving incentive pay.
While the Riedel etal. (1988) study provides useful data with respect to the
efficacy o f individual monetary incentives, there are two issues which make the utility
of the results somewhat questionable. First, the effects of daily performance feedback
are not accounted for in the results data. Balcazar, Hopkins, and Suarez (1986)
suggest that performance feedback may have a supplemental effect on performance
when used in conjunction with differential consequences. Research has shown
consistently that feedback in combination with monetary incentives (e.g., Abernathy et
al., 1982; Dierks & McNally, 1987; Gaetani etal., 1985; Haynes, Pine, & Finch,
1982) improves performance. Second, the data analysis is based solely on subject
performance on the third work day which fails to capture performance trends over time.
Frisch and Dickinson (1990) and Dickinson et al. (1991) continued research
into the efficacy o f various percentages of incentive to base pay. These researchers
enhanced the laboratory simulation by including a systematic investigation o f the effects
o f competitive sources o f reinforcement Subjects were permitted to take work breaks
during which they could socialize with other subjects, study, read, consume
refreshments, etc. In real-world work environments employees are not confined to
simply performing their assigned tasks. Typically, there are many other sources of
reinforcement during the course of a work shift Therefore, as Dickinson and Gillette
(1993) showed, the results o f incentive research could be viewed as having limited
external validity when competitive sources of reinforcement are not included in the
study. In such situations it could be argued that the incentive pay system increases
performance by increasing the amount of time a worker spends on task.
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Frisch and Dickinson (1990) challenged the validity o f Fein’s (1970) contention
that incentive potential below 30% o f base pay will not greatly affect performance nor
will incentive potential above 30% significantly increase worker performance. The
researchers tested the efficacy o f five pay systems: (a) base pay or 0% incentive, (b)
base pay plus 3% incentive, (c) base pay plus 13%, (d) base pay plus 25%, and (e)
base pay plus 54% incentive. The pay systems were designed to pay a maximum o f
$4.00 per work session, therefore, the amount o f money that could be earned in any
one session was held constant across all work groups. Subjects working in groups o f
fifteen while being paid individual incentives performed a work task assembling parts
from bolts, nuts and washers, similar to piece-work tasks performed in true work
environments. A minimum o f fifty quality parts per session was required to receive
pay for the session. Subjects participated in fifteen forty-five minute sessions.
Results were consistent with those in the Riedel et al. (1988) study.
Performance for subjects in the four incentive groups was significantly better than for
subjects in the non-incentive group. More interestingly, incentives as low as 3% o f
base pay proved effective in generating higher performance levels which runs counter
to Fein’s premise. However, the second part o f Fein’s premise is supported in that
performance was comparable under the four incentive systems and there were no
corresponding increases in performance with increases in incentive percentage.
Dickinson et al. (1991), conducting a systematic replication o f the Frisch and
Dickinson (1990) research, expanded the investigation of percentage o f incentives to
base pay by moving into the real work arena. The researchers sought to determine
whether the incentive effects obtained in the laboratory simulation would generalize to
an applied setting, more specifically to roll-off truck drivers employed by a municipal
disposal service.
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In a multiple-baseline design twenty track drivers received a guaranteed base
pay and incentive pay when their weekly individual performance exceeded the average
group performance during baseline. Incentives were delivered on a per-job basis.
When performance exceeded average performance, the driver received a per-job
incentive for each job completed. The multiple-baseline design consisted of a
five-month baseline for one group followed by a one-month period o f hourly pay with
feedback followed by the implementation o f the incentive system. For the second
group, the incentive system was implemented three months later. The exposure to the
incentive levels was extensive: seven months for the 3% incentive; nine months to the
6% incentive; fourteen months to the 10% incentive.
Mixed results were reported. Significant increases in performance occurred
when drivers were paid a mere 3% incentive over base pay and these increases were
maintained over time. When the incentive percentage was increased to 6% and 10% of
their total pay, performance increased beyond the 3% level for some drivers and
decreased for other drivers. These results from a real work setting support the
conclusions Frisch and Dickinson (1990) drew from their laboratory simulations. That
is, incentive pay systems can generate higher performance levels when the incentive is
as small as 3% o f total pay.
Others have continued this line o f empirical inquiry. Leary et al. (1990)
conducted a similar percentage o f incentive to base pay study. A within-subjects design
was used to evaluate the effects o f incentive pay on the performance of individuals
engaged in constructing widgets from popbeads. There were five pay systems: (1) flat
pay o f $1.00, (2) 25% o f $1.00 flat pay plus $.10 per widgets over the 10 widget
minimum performance standard, (3) 50% o f play pay plus $. 10 per widget, (4) 75%
plus $.10 per widget, and (5) 100% plus $.10 per widget. The results obtained in the
prior studies were replicated by Leary and her colleagues. Performance in all incentive
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pay conditions was significantly greater compared to widget productivity during the flat
pay condition and the four incentive systems were equally effective in generating
performance improvements.
Dickinson and Gillette (1993) extended this line o f investigation in two studies
where they compared the effects o f a base pay plus incentive system with the effects of
a piece rate pay system in which 100% o f the workers' pay was incentive. Unlike the
Frisch and Dickinson (1990) and Leary et al. (1990) studies, the length o f the work
session, three to four hours, was more representative of a typical work environment.
In addition, competitive sources o f reinforcement were enhanced whereby subjects
were advised they could take breaks whenever they wanted and that during those
breaks they could engage in any activities they wanted (e.g., reading, studying, using
the telephone, socializing). Also, refreshments and magazines were made available
during break periods. The final variation was the inclusion of a within-subjects design.
For the first study, subjects engaged in a computerized check verification task
during nine 3-hour sessions. The task consisted o f subjects scanning the dollar value
o f simulated checks appearing on a computer screen and, then, typing the value o f each
check. The dependent variable was the number of corrected completed checks. A
within-subjects, reversal design was employed to evaluate the two pay systems. Under
the piece rate pay system subjects received a per-check incentive and could earn $5.00
for completing 1300 checks per hour. Subjects could earn more than $5.00 per hour
for completing more checks. The 1300 checks was considered average performance
per hour and served as a benchmark for both pay systems. Under the base pay plus
incentive system subjects received a guaranteed base rate and could earn a per-check
incentive for exceeding a performance minimum standard. The system was designed
so that 70% was guaranteed hourly wages and 30% was incentive-based. The two
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different systems were set up so that subjects would earn the same amount o f money
for 1300 correct checks.
The results led the researchers to two general conclusions. First, while there
was a “stronger link between performance and pay in the piece rate pay condition”
(Dickinson & Gillette, 1993, p. 33), what Lawler (1990) calls a short line o f sight,
performance was not higher during this condition. Second, performance rates were not
systematically affected by the proportion of total pay that was incentive-based.
Study 2 was a systematic replication o f Study 1 and included four major
changes. First, an individualized performance standard was added. Second, a similar
change was made in the average performance level for the piece rate pay system which
resulted in subjects being able to earn $4.50 per hour for completing 1250 checks.
Third, work sessions were extended from three to four hours. Fourth, individualized
performance standards per subject were used under both incentive systems.
Generally, the results indicate that there was no systematic relationship between
productivity levels and the percentage o f total pay that was incentive-based. And, the
two pay systems produced comparable results. Therefore, one pay system does not
appear superior with respect to generating higher performance. For example, the
subjects who completed more checks during the base pay plus incentive condition (the
second phase) than during the piece rate condition (the first phase), showed further
increases in check production during the final phase which was the reintroduction of the
piece rate pay system. Similar trends were observed for subjects working under the
base pay plus incentive • piece rate - base pay plus incentive configuration.
Considering the overall effects from the two studies, it can be seen that the
Dickinson and Gillette (1993) results are consistent with those observed in the studies
conducted by Frisch and Dickinson (1990), Leary et al. (1990), Riedel et al. (1988)
and Dickinson et al. (1991). The Dickinson and Gillette studies resulted in subjects
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earning percentages o f base pay ranging from 2% to 52%. In line with the findings in
previous investigations, these percentages did not produce differential performance
rates. However, a consistent finding among all ofthe base pay phis incentive
percentage studies is that just about any percentage will be effective.
Linear Versus Mon-Linear Pay Systems
The pay curve investigations compared the effects o f linear and non-linear
incentive pay systems to the effects o f flat or hourly-type pay systems. Essentially, pay
curve studies have attempted to answer such questions as “what is the optimum
incentive pay system with respect to productivity and cost minimization and, how much
incentive is necessary to generate significantly higher productivity levels?” Previous
research on hourly pay versus incentive pay has consistently shown incentive pay to be
superior in producing performance improvements. For example, Dierks and McNally
(1987) reported significant increases, 200% to 300% over hourly pay rates, for
employees o f the Union National Bank in Little Rock, Arkansas.
Oah and Dickinson (1992) extended these empirical comparisons by looking at
the effects o f a linear and an exponential (or positively accelerating) incentive pay
system. More specifically, two research questions were investigated: (1) Docs an
exponential performance pay function increase productivity more quickly than a linear
performance pay function? and (2) Does an exponential performance pay function
sustain higher levels o f productivity?
Subjects were paid under one o f two incentive pay systems while performing a
computerized check-proofing task during fifteen 45-minute sessions. For the incentive
system, the per check incentive increased exponentially as the number o f completed
checks increased, whereas the per check incentive remained constant under the linear
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incentive system. All subjects earned a minimum of $2.00 per work session provided
the productivity standard o f490 checks was achieved.
Interestingly, a visual analysis o fthe data indicates that performance was
consistently higher for subjects in the exponential pay condition, however, statistical
analysis showed that the productivity differences between the two pay systems was not
significant Therefore, Oah and Dickinson (1992) concluded that productivity was not
differentially affected by the linear and exponential incentive pay systems.
Smoot and Duncan (1997) conducted a series of four laboratory studies in
which independent variables were systematically varied to answer a series o f questions
about the efficacy o f linear and non-linear incentive pay systems. The initial study in
the series extended the work o f Oah and Dickinson (1992) by adding a negatively
accelerating pay system. Thus, in all four studies the effects of a flat pay system were
compared to the effects of three incentive pay systems - linear, positively accelerating
and negatively accelerating. The next three studies were progressive extensions with
the findings o f each providing a basis for further refinements of the experimental
question.
The second study was expanded to include a manipulation of feedback. The
role of feedback in the optimum incentive pay system is well worth investigation given
that feedback often yields positive effects on worker performance (e.g., Dierks &
McNally, 1987; Gaetani et al., 1985; Karan & Kopelman, 1987; Silva, Duncan, &
Doudna, 1982). It is accepted that incidental feedback is present in all incentive pay
situations. However, while researchers have demonstrated that feedback in
combination with monetary incentives is effective (e.g., Abernathy et al., 1982; Haynes
et al., 1982), the supplemental effects o f feedback on performance beyond
improvements derived from the individual monetary incentive systems have yet to be
empirically investigated. The investigation o f the supplemental effects of feedback was
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accomplished by introducing the incentive system with feedback and then removing the
feedback during the final incentive pay condition.
The third study extended the second through the addition o f a work setting
manipulation to assess the effects o f the presence o f others on productivity when an
incentive pay system is operative. Investigations o f the pay-performance contingency
had assessed the effects o f individual versus group incentives and the effects of
incentives on worker performance in various sized groups (e.g.t Stoneman &
Dickinson, 1989). However, the effects o f the mere presence o f other workers on
productivity levels when an individual monetary incentive system is in place had not
been empirically investigated.
The fourth study directly replicated the third study and added the calculation o f
the percentage o f incentive to base pay actually earned by subjects. As has been
discussed earlier, research on monetary incentive-to-base pay (Dickinson et al., 1991;
Frisch & Dickinson, 1990) demonstrated that incentives as low as 2% produced
substantial performance increases. However, in all studies subjects performed
comparably and there was virtually no difference in performance improvements when
subjects were paid incentives ranging from 2% to 100%. Calculation o f the incentiveto-base pay in the fourth study was intended to provide additional information in
clarifying the functional relationship between pay level and performance.
Methods and experimental design were similar for the four studies. First, the
same performance task of constructing widgets from pop beads was employed.
Second, a within-subject, multiple-baseline, counterbalanced design was used where all
subjects worked under a flat pay condition and one o f the three incentive pay systems.
Third, subjects worked in fifteen-minute work sessions for twenty to twenty-five
sessions.
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Two consistent findings emerged from the four studies. First, the incentive pay
systems generated higher productivity levels than did the flat pay systems with
productivity increases over flat pay levels tanging from 3.5% to 49.3% This finding is
consistent with the results o f earlier pay-for-perfoimance investigations. Second,
productivity was differentially affected by the three incentive pay systems.
Interestingly, this finding is inconsistent with the results ofthe Oah and Dickinson
(1992) study. In Experiments 1 and 2, the linear system produced the greatest gain in
widget productivity, whereas in Experiments 3 and 4, the positively accelerating system
generated the highest levels o f productivity. And, while productivity under the
negatively accelerating system increased in all four studies, improvements were less
substantial.
Smoot and Duncan (1997) also looked at the cost effectiveness o f the three
incentive pay systems and found a pattern with respect to generating higher levels of
performance while minimizing cost In Experiments 2 through 4, the negatively
accelerating system proved to be the best and the system was considered second best in
Experiment 1. These findings are particularly interesting considering the design o f the
negatively accelerating system where each additional widget is worth slightly less than
the previous widget.
While the manipulation o f the incentive pay systems produced clear differences,
the precise impact that the presence or absence o f others had upon the incentive pay
systems was unclear. First, the data indicated that any change in work setting,
individual to group or group to individual, had some effect on productivity. This effect
was observed in 5 o f the 6 groups in Experiment 3 with productivity increases in four
groups and lowered productivity in one group.
The data from Experiment 4 contradict Fein (1970) and Henderson (1985). For
example, the 30% incentive level for subjects in the linear groups was paid for 13
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widgets yet mean productivity during the incentive condition was 22.3 widgets
representing a percentage o f incentive to base pay level o f 65.5%.
Finally, supplemental effects o f feedback were not found during Experiment 2.
However, the feedback manipulation, in and of itself, may have interfered with widget
productivity. Subjects were given a copy o f the pay scale they were working under and
were required to place a check mark on the sheet indicating they had completed another
widget. It is very likely that stopping to make the check marks took enough time away
from the task to decrease the number o f widgets that could be completed in the fifteen
minute session.
Incentives With Performance Feedback or Performance Goals
Other researchers have focused specifically on the effects o f monetary
incentives in conjunction with performance feedback. They have found the
combination to be effective in generating higher productivity among bank employees
(Abernathy e tal., 1982) and among auto machinists (Gaetani et al., 1985).
Abernathy et al. (1982) demonstrated an hourly rate plus incentive combined
with performance feedback to be more effective than an hourly rate with feedback.
The incentive consisted o f giving points, which were worth $.75 each, for exceeding
hourly performance standards. One point was given for exceeding a standard of 1700
items, two points for exceeding 2100 items and three points for exceeding 2500 items
per hour. Proof operators improved their performance from an average o f 2200 items
per hour under the hourly pay plus feedback system to an average o f 2700 items per
hour under the incentive plus feedback system.
In another bank, the implementation o f a new incentive system that closely
approximated the system described above resulted in greater improvements. Under the
old incentive system, proofers were given cash incentives, ranging from 20% to 30%
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o f base pay, for exceeding a 1000 item per hour standard. The new system paid
proofers an hourly rate plus $.25 for every hour that performance exceeded a standard
o f 2200 items per hour. Performance improved from an average o f 1465 items under
the old system to 2250 items under the new system.
In another applied study, Gaetani et al. (1985) demonstrated that a commission
plus feedback system can have dramatic effects on the performance o f auto machinists.
The incentive system had three major components: (1) employee-generated feedback
which consisted o f the mechanic tallying the daily invoices, (2) performance had to
exceed an historical standard in order for any incentive pay to be earned, (3) the hourly
rate was paid plus a commission o f 5% of the dollar value (o f work billed to customers)
over the historical standard. Daily productivity averages increased from $77.10 to
$238.00 for one machinist and from $98.23 to $269.00 for the other machinist.
Other combinations of interventions has been investigated. Campbell (1984)
compared the effects o f incentives with performance goals with the effects o f hourly
pay. His findings indicate that performance was significantly better for individuals paid
under incentive w/performance goals. And, while the performance for those paid
under the hourly pay system was slightly better than those subjects who received no
pay, the difference between the two groups was not statistically significant.
Group Incentive Pav Systems
Finally, monetary incentive studies have asked the question “which is better at
controlling higher levels of performance - individual or group incentive systems?”
According to Farr (1976) and Johnstone et al. (1989), the answer is both are equally
effective. The results of both studies indicate that individual and group incentive
systems are comparably effective in generating higher performance levels when

Reproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

compared to productivity under hourly pay plans. The more important variable is the
pay for performance contingency.
Stoneman and Dicldnson (1989) and Roberts and Leary (1989) extended the
individual versus group line of investigation by looking at the efficacy o f incentives in
groups o f varying size. Both studies reported that group productivity did not differ as a
function o f group size for small groups. However, what has been seen in previous
incentive studies was also evidenced in the Stoneman and Dicldnson (1989) and the
Roberts and Leary (1989) studies. That is, monetary incentives effected productivity
improvements.
Summary Comments About Incentive Pav Systems
The studies discussed thus far have documented the effectiveness o f monetary
incentives in laboratory simulations and in field studies. Common themes that have
emerged from the more than twenty years o f investigations are: (a) monetary incentives
are better at generating and maintaining higher performance levels than are hourly pay
systems; (b) incentive systems are effective when people ate engaged in manual, simple
tasks and in more complex tasks (e.g., computer simulations); and (c) what seems to
matter more than the magnitude o f the incentive is the pay-for-performance
contingency. To elaborate on this point, it seems clear that the defining consequence is
the fact that people do more when they earn more.
Teamwork
The search for solutions to productivity problems has not been restricted to
incentive systems. Organizations, following the lead o f Deming(1986) and Berry
(1991), have turned to teamwork and the “Total Quality Management” concept
Annually, over 10,000 people attend Deming’s four-day seminars, which emphasize

Reproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

improvements through cooperative efforts (Geller, 1992). According to Wellins,
Byham, and Wilson (L991), approximately 25% o f all U. S. industries are
experimenting with work teams to improve quality and quantity. Reich (1987) has
proclaimed the “team as hero” in resurrecting U. S. economic stability and improving
the country’s position in the world market. In light o f the above, and given that
practical evidence of the proliferation o f the work team concept can easily be found in
everyday life, it seems reasonable to conclude that the implementation of work teams
will continue to grow.
The Social Loafing Problem
Interestingly, according to some social psychology literature, teamwork may
not be a solution at all, but may actually constitute another source o f productivity
problems in the form o f “social loafing” (Brickner, Harkins, & Ostrom, 1986; Harkins
& Jackson, 1985; Harkins &Szymanski, 1989; Jackson & Williams, 1985). The
phenomenon o f social loafing, a term coined by Latane’, Williams, and Harkins
(1979), is said to involve the loss o f individual motivation to perform when working in
a group coaction setting. Coaction occurs when individual outputs are summed and the
group’s performance is presented as this sum. Social loafing is said to exist when the
level o f an individual’s performance in an “alone” setting is greater than the level of
that same individual’s productivity when working in a coaction setting with others.
Since Latane’ etal. (1979) first labeled this behavioral phenomenon as social
loafing 40 to 50 studies have been conducted to test hypotheses, to derive explanations
for social loafing, and to uncover effective intervention strategies. Six general
explanations have emerged from the studies and have been used as evidence o f the
generality o f social loafing to different sized groups and tasks: “Social Loafing Effect”
(Latane’ et al., 1979); “Free-Rider Effect” (Kerr& Brunn, 1983); “Output Equity”
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which subsumes the “Sucker Effect” (Kerr, 1983) and “Expectancy Theory” (Jackson
& Harkins, 1985); “Hide In The Crowd/Lost In The Crowd Effects” (Kerr & Bruun,
1981); Matching To Standard (Harkins & Jackson 1985); Absence of Personal
Involvement (Brickneretal., 1986).
While the social loafing effect, free-rider effect, sucker effect, and hide in the
crowd/lost-in-the-crowd effects were originally put forth as specific forms o f social
loafing, it seems that these phenomena are more appropriately viewed as explanations
for the occurrence o f social loafing. Therefore, the following discussion treats those
effects as explanations for rather than outcomes o f social loafing behavior.
Another important point with respect to the following treatment of the social
loafing research has to do with the absence o f laboratory simulations. It is clear that the
overall purpose of the collective body of social loafing research was to uncover the
underlying causes o f social loafing behavior not to determine the functional
relationships in order to control and eliminate social loafing in the workplace, which is
the focus o f OBM research. The lines of analysis for social psychologists and behavior
analysts are at cross purposes. Therefore, the absence of appropriate laboratory
simulations in the social psychology research is not a flaw in the studies, rather the
absence of a work place simulation makes the results of the studies not terribly useful to
OBM practitioners.
Causes o f Social Loafing
Social Loafing Effect Explanation. While Latane’ et al. (1979) are credited with
coining the term “social loafing”, according to Kravitz and Martin (1986),the first
empirical investigation of behavior decrement in groups is attributed to Ringlemann
more than 50 years earlier. In Ringlemann’s experiment, subjects acting alone or with
one, two, or seven others, were asked to pull as hard as they could on a rope.
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Individuals averaged 63 kg o f pressure, while dyads pulled at 93% o f the sum o f their
individual efforts, trios at 85%, and groups o f eight at 49%.
Ringlemann’s research has been reviewed by a number o f social psychologists
(Ingham, Levinger, Graves, & Peckham, 1974; Steiner, 1966; Zajonc, 1966).
Interestingly, the reviews have been mixed in that some conclude that the results are
indicative of "motivation” loss when working coactively (social loafing) and others
attribute the performance differences to coordination loss. For example, Ingham et al.
(1974), in two studies attempting to replicate the Ringlemann results, reported that
decrements in rope-pulling performance were a function of motivation loss rather than
coordination loss. A mote interesting finding from both studies was that increases in
performance decrements were correlated with increases in group size but only up to
three member groups. In other words, there were no significant increases in
performance decrements after the addition of a fourth, fifth or sixth group member.
This later finding is contradictory to the Latane’ et al. (1979) findings.
The early works o f Latane’ et al. (1979), Harkins, Latane’, and Williams
(1980), and Kerr and Bruun (1981) kicked off a new wave o f investigations o f the
phenomenon. Latane’ et al. (1979) conducted two laboratory experiments in which
group size (alone and groups of 2 ,4 , and 6) was manipulated and the dependent
variable was the effort "used” in generating noise expressed as dyneVcm. In the first
study, subjects cheered (said Rah! Rah!) during 36 five-second trials and clapped their
hands during 36 five-second trials alone, in groups o f 2,4 and 6. Individuals working
alone averaged 3.7 dynes/cm, 2.6 in pairs, 1.8 and 1.5 in groups o f four and six,
respectively. Put another way, dyads worked at 71% of the sum o f their individual
efforts, groups o f four at 51%, and groups of six at 40%. For the second study,
subjects were told to "feel free to let loose and really shout” (Latane’ et al., 1979, p.
827). Thus, the performance task was limited to shouting in the second experim ent
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As opposed to the fust study, these subjects wore blindfolds and earplugs and,
therefore, were not affected by the noise produced by other subjects. Each subject
shouted alone, in groups o f 2 and in groups o f 6 for a total o f 24 trials. Results
indicate that groups o f two shouted at 66% o f the sum o f individual efforts and groups
o fsix at3 6% .
Expanding on their original notion o f social loafing, Latane’ and his colleagues
drew four general conclusions. First, when engaged in an effortful and physically
fatiguing task, individuals exhibit a sizable decrease in effort when working in groups.
Second, as group size increases individual output decreases. Third, as group size
increases the total group effort increases but at a slower rate than would be expected
from the sum o f the individual outputs. Fourth, behavioral decrements in groups may
be a function o f “attribution and equity” (subjects reduce their efforts to match what
they perceive to be the level of effort by other group members), “submaximal goal
setting” (subjects ignored the experimenter’s instruction to “let loose and really shout”
and set their own lower goals), or “lessened contingency between input and output”
(subjects believed their efforts would not be identified among the total group’s effort).
In two systematic replications, Harkins et al. (1980) hypothesized that social
loafing may be a function o f adopting an “allocational strategy or a “minimizing
strategy.” When employing an “allocational strategy,” people are said to
Realize, they have only a finite amount o f resources to put into a task. Given the
choice between working hard with others or concentrating their efforts on
performing alone, they may decide to allocate more energy to the alone trials
where their efforts can be identified and rewarded (Harkins et al., 1980, p.
459).
When employing a “minimizing strategy,” people are said to “wish to minimize their
overall energy expenditure,” particularly in the case where the task such as “making
loud sounds is tiring work” (Harkins et al., 1980, p. 459).
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In the first study, group size (alone and in groups o f 2) and the perception o f
working with others (pseudo-groups) were the independent variables and sound
pressure produced from a hand clapping task was the dependent measure. The pseudo
group condition was arranged by manipulating the verbal instructions to subjects. All
subjects wore headphones and were told that the study was to investigate the effect o f
sensory feedback reduction on the production o f sound in social groups. All
instructions to subjects were delivered via stereophonic recording through the
headphones. In the pseudo group condition, the relevant subjects were told they were
clapping with someone else, while the non-pseudo group subjects were given the
instruction “no one clap.” In actuality, some subjects always clapped alone, some
subjects clapped alone but perceived they clapped with others (pseudo groups), and
some subjects clapped alone sometimes and sometimes perceived they were clapping
with others (pseudo groups). Capping trials lasted for 5 seconds each and all subjects
clapped for 6 trials. The data indicate that when performing in groups, subjects
produced only 75% as much noise as when performing alone. And, subjects who
perceived they were clapping with others (in pseudo groups) produced only 62% o f the
noise created by subjects who always performed alone.
For the second study, the performance task, trial duration, and number o f trials
remained the same. Though, the second study differed from the first study in that half
o f the subjects always clapped alone while the other half were told they would always
clap in pairs to create the pseudo-group work condition. In actuality, all subjects
always-dapped alone. The results reported in the first study were replicated in that
subjects who perceived they were clapping with another person produced only 57% o f
the noise produced by subjects who always clapped alone.
Five conclusions were drawn. First, individuals who performed alone and in a
group made less noise when clapping with a partner. Second, individuals who clapped
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in groups exclusively and, therefore, had no reason to conserve energy for individual
trials, exhibited social loafing. Third, subjects working in pseudogroups (perceived
they were working with another person) exhibited social loafing because they clapped
less loudly than when they clapped alone. Fourth, social loafing is not the result o f
adopting an “allocation strategy,” it occurs when people work in groups, regardless o f
whether they have also worked alone. Fifth, the observed social loafing behavior is the
result of adopting a “minimizing strategy.”
Another study on allocational strategy, dubbed the “me-first” explanation, was
conducted by Kerr and Bruun (1981), but they approached the concept from a different
angle. Rather than attempting to show that conserving energy accounts for social
loafing behavior, the researcher set out to show that when there is no need to conserve
energy to protect one’s self-interest social loafing will not occur. Kerr and Bruun
(1981) predicted that “when group size is manipulated between-subjects the social
loafing effect should not obtain, or at least should be sharply attenuated” (p. 225).
Using an air pumping task over 14 trials, the performance o f subjects in a
within-subject condition, who pumped in groups o f 1, 2 and 4, was compared to
subjects in a between-subject condition, who pumped in a single-sized group. The data
from the within-subject manipulation indicates that social loafing behavior was obtained
and as group size increased social loafing increased. A similar performance pattern was
also observed in the betwecn-subject condition leading Kerr and Bruun (1981) to
conclude that social loafing behavior does not occur exclusively in settings where
individuals must work sequentially in different sized groups. Further, they concluded
that in-tact (stable) groups are susceptible to social loafing. As a result o f these
findings, Kerr and Bruun (1981) concluded that their prediction was not supported and
determined that the “me-first” explanation o f social loafing was not confirmed with
respect to a physically demanding task.
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These Initial studies resulted in labeling performance decrements in groups as
social loafing and lead to identifying two parameters essential to determining the
occurrence o f social loafing behavior (1) the performance task must be effortful and
physically fatiguing, and (2) as group size increases individual output decreases.
Free Rider Effect Explanation. The free-rider effect explanation, first postulated
by Kerr and Brunn (1981), suggests that individuals will reduce their performance level
when it is perceived that they can benefit from the contributions o f other group
members. “Given this perception, the individual concludes that his or her output is
dispensable, and exerts little effort as a result” (Geen, 1991 p. 389). Put another way,
“free-rider refers to a member of a group who obtains benefits from group membership
but does not bear a proportional share of the costs of providing the benefits’*(Albanese
& Van Fleet, 1985, p. 244).
Three laboratory studies conducted by Kerr and Brunn (1983) have been
offered as evidence for the free-rider explanation. The studies tested the general
hypothesis that group members exert less effort as the perceived dispensability o f their
efforts for group success increases. Kerr and Bruun (1983) have drawn the connection
between social loafing and “dispensability o f effort” from Olson’s (1965) economic
analysis of the basis for apathy in seeking public goods. According to Olson,
dispensability o f effort occurs when an individual expects she or he can obtain the
valued results o f successful task performance when she or he exerts little or no effort
because success can be achieved through the group’s efforts; and the larger the group
the more dispensable individual efforts are for group success and the less motivated the
individual will be. Kerr and Bruun (1983) have qualified Olson’s notion o f
“dispensability o f effort” by asserting that dispensability is also dependent upon the
individual perceiving others in the group to be more capable o f performing the task and
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labeled the resulting explanation o f social loafing as the free-rider effect. Given that the
three studies are similar, the following discussion covets only the first o f the three. An
expanded discussion ofthe other two studies appears in the literature review.
For the first study an air-blowing task was employed to test four predictions:
(1) Ability will have opposite effects on task motivation for disjunctive and conjunctive
tasks, (2) Effort will decline with group size for both disjunctive and conjunctive tasks,
(3) Ability will have opposite effects on perceived dispensability o f individual effort for
disjunctive and conjunctive tasks, and (4) Perceived dispensability o f individual effort
for group success will increase with increases in group size. Disjunctive tasks require
that the group product be the contribution o f the most able group member, whereas
conjunctive tasks require that the group product be the contribution ofthe least able
group member (Steiner, 1972). For additive tasks the group product is the sum or
average ofthe individual contributions (Steiner, 1972). Four independent variables
were manipulated: (1) group size (alone, in groups o f 2,4 , and 8); (2) member ability
(high and low); (3) task demands (additive, disjunctive, conjunctive); and (4) subject
sex (male vs. female). Member ability was manipulated by giving subjects contrived
feedback on pretrial performance. Subjects were shown their score as well as the
scores o f the others in their group. All subjects performed in isolation but were told
they were part o f a group. Subjects completed six 30-sec performance trials with 1
minute intertrial intervals. The dependent variables were an index o f subject task
motivation derived from task performance scores, foe amount of air pumped per trial,
and perceived dispensability derived from self report data.
Performance on foe air-blowing task was used to determine subject task
motivation and to draw conclusions about the first prediction. The following was
provided as evidence that member ability had opposite effects on member task
motivation for disjunctive and conjunctive tasks. Low-ability subjects produced less air
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during the disjunctive task condition (where only the best score counted) and,
therefore, were considered to be less motivated. High-ability subjects produced less air
during the conjunctive task condition (where only the worst score counted) and,
therefore, were considered to be less motivated.
The prediction that member effort will decline with group size for disjunctive
and conjunctive tasks was not supported. The performance data indicate just the
opposite occurred with dyads averaging 95.9 c.l., tetrads 102 c.l., and groups o f eight
99.25 c.l.
With respect to the third and fourth predictions, the data support one but not the
other. For the ability x task demand prediction, the self report data indicate that highability subjects felt more important than the low-ability subjects in the disjunctive task
condition, however, the opposite occurred in the conjunctive task condition. Thus, the
third prediction was considered to be supported by the data. The prediction that
perceived dispensability would increase with increases in group size was not supported
in that only one comparison was statistically significant An additional finding was a
main effect for subject sex in that males were deemed more capable than females with
respect to the air blowing task.
The findings among the three studies are consistent in some respects and
contradictory in other ways. However, the consistencies across the studies lead to the
inclusion of two additional parameteis (in addition to the coaction and group size
parameters identified by Latane’ et al. (1979) for the occurrence of social loafing: (1)
individual workers must perceive that their personal efforts are not needed (are
dispensable) for the group to succeed, therefore, they can loaf and still reap the
maximum benefits, and (2) individual workers must perceive that others in the group
are more capable (can perform the task better).
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Output Equity Explanation. The output equity explanation o f social loafing
behavior takes two forms, the sucker effect and expectation o f co-worker performance.
First, the sucker effect arises when individuals perceive that other group members are
benefiting from their contributions. Others in the group who are capable ofhigh
performance are seen as free riding, thereby, making the high-performing individual a
“sucker” (Kerr, 1983). “Rather than exert effort while others do not, the person
achieves a sort o f equity by reducing his or her output” (Geen, 1991, p. 389). Second,
when working in a group, individuals will “reduce their own efforts to establish an
equitable division o f labor” (Jackson & Harkins, 1985, p. 1199) when they expect their
co-workers to loaf.
With the introduction o f the sucker effect explanation, Kerr (1983) offers an
alternative to his free-rider explanation. In the free-rider explanation, individuals
reduce their efforts when working in a group because they perceive that their efforts are
not needed and they can benefit from the efforts of the other group members; whereas
in the sucker effect explanation, individuals perceive that other capable members o f the
group are free riding on their efforts and, therefore, they lower their performance to
achieve equity.
Kerr (1983) tested the general hypothesis that group members would exert less
effort if they perceived their partner was capable of contributing to the group but would
not. Using a between-subjects design, Kerr manipulated three independent variables:
(1) group size (alone and dyads), (2) subject sex (male and female), and (3) perception
of partner ability. Kerr did two things to accomplish the manipulation ofthe third IV.
First, subjects were told their partner was either capable or incapable o f performing the
task to criterion. Second, contrived feedback matching the partner’s mock ability level
was given to subjects.
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There were four experimental conditions and a control condition. In the first
experimental condition, which was called the able/succeeds condition, subjects were
told their partner was capable o f performing die task and the performance feedback
indicated that their partner always succeeded. This condition was included as a test of
Kerr’s free rider explanation. In the able/fails condition, which was designed to test the
sucker effect explanation, the partner was capable of performing the task but the
contrived feedback indicated that the partner consistently failed to meet the performance
criterion. In the unable/fails condition, die partner was designated as incapable and the
feedback indicated that the partner consistently failed to teach criterion. The individual
model condition provided the “alone” comparison which is essential to all social loafing
research. Here the subjects performed “alone” in that they did not have a designated
partner, however, they worked with a “high ability” subject who consistendy failed at
the task. The control condition provided a baseline comparison because the subjects
worked individually and were not exposed to the independent variables. Even though
subjects were told they were working with a partner, all subjects worked in isolation.
In each dyad, there was only one real participant because the partner who was
designated as capable or incapable was a confederate. The performance task was
identical to the air pumping task in the Kerr and Bruun (1983) study described in the
free rider explanation section above. Subjects engaged in nine 30-second trials. The
dependent variable was the proportion of trials that reached or exceeded the criterion of
350 ml. If either member of the dyad reached criterion on a trial, then the group
succeeded on the trial. O f course, the performance levels o f the confederates were
contrived and in the able/succeeds condition the feedback indicated that the confederate
had met the criterion.
As predicted, Kerr found contrasting effects. For dyads in the able/fails
condition, actual success rate was 75.4% compared to a 88.9% success rate o f the
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control group. From these data, Kerr concluded that the sucker effect was “clearly
obtained and that subjects sometimes preferred to fail at the task rather than be a sucker
and carry a free rider* (Kerr, 1983, p. 823). In contrast, for the dyads in the unable/
fails condition, where one partner was designated as unable and the contrived feedback
indicated the partner consistently failed to reach criterion, trial success rate for the real
participant was 84.4% (compared to the control rate o f 88.9%). In this case, Kerr
concluded that social loafing did not occur because subjects were willing to carry an
incapable partner. In addition, Kerr concluded that the free-rider effect explanation
accounted for the performance decrements observed in the able/succeeds dyads where
the success rate was only 74.6% compared to the control rate of 88.9%. “A capable
partner who consistently succeeded and thereby guaranteed the success o f the group
presented the subjects with a situation in which their efforts were clearly dispensable
for group success” (Kerr, 1983, p. 826). With respect to the individual model
condition, subjects succeeded on 95.4% of the trials which is considerably higher than
the 88.9% success rate o f the control group. Therefore, social loafing was not
observed in these subjects.
The output equity explanation has been investigated from the perspective of
subject expectation o f co-worker effort while engaged in a physical and an idea
generation task (Jackson & Harkins, 1985; Williams & Karau, 1991) and in terms o f
self-efficacy and outcome expectancy while engaged in a vigilance task (Sanna, 1992).
Jackson and Harkins (1985) and Williams and Karau (1991) looked at the notion that
when people work in groups they expect their co-workers to loaf and, therefore, reduce
their own outputs to achieve equity in effort. When working in a group, individuals
will “reduce their own efforts to establish an equitable division o f labor* (Jackson &
Harkins, 1985, p. 1199) when they expect their co-workers to loaf.
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To test their general hypothesis, Jackson and Harkins (1985) employed a
shouting task (shout Raaaah for as long as possible) with female undergraduates. The
manipulation o f expectation was accomplished by confederates, acting as the other half
o f the dyad, who would feed their partners contrived performance feedback from the
confederate’s pre-trials on the shouting tasks. There were four experimental conditions
where all subjects shouted alone and with a partner. In the alone condition, subjects
simply performed the shouting task without a partner. When in the whigh-effort group
condition”, the confederate told her partner that “she had tried very hard on the practice
trial and, because she thought the research was interesting, she was going to try hard
throughout the experim ent” Those subjects in the “low-effort group condition,” the
confederate told her partner that “she had not tried on the practice shout and, because
she thought the research was boring, she wasn’t going to try hard during the rest of the
experiment.” And, in the “social loafing replication group condition,” the confederate
provided her partner no information on practice trial performance. This condition was a
means to replicate social loafing behavior as originally described by Latane’ et al.
(1979).
The researchers cite the following data as support for the expectation
explanation and concluded that individuals “who expect their co-performers to loaf, will
reduce their own efforts to establish an equitable division o f labor” (p. 1199). For the
social loafing replication condition, subjects shouting alone generated more noise (mean
= 4.58 dynes/cm) than when they thought they shouted with a partner (mean * 3.6).
These alone/group differences in performance were eliminated in the high-effort and
low-effort conditions. In the high-effort condition the alone performance mean was
6.77 dynes and the group mean was 6.66 dynes. A similar pattern was observed in the
low-effort condition where subjects generated similar levels o f noise in the alone (mean
= 3.73) and group (3.45) settings than was generated by subjects in the “no
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manipulation” condition. The performance of subjects in the alone and group low
effort conditions was less than that for subjects in the alone and group social loafing
replication conditions. In addition, to rule out the sucker effect explanation as the cause
o f the loafing effect, Jackson and Harkins (1985) performed a manipulation check
whereby subjects were asked to indicate whether their partners were more, less or
equally capable as themselves at performing the shouting tasks. The self-report data
indicate there were no reliable differences in ability.
In contrast, Williams and Karau (1991) used an “idea generation” task in three
experiments to test the “social compensation” hypothesis of social loafing which is in
opposition to the hypothesis offered by Jackson and Harkins (1985). The social
compensation hypothesis states “that people will work harder collectively than
individually when they expect their co-workers to perform poorly on a meaningful
task” (p. 570). Therefore, worker expectation was a common theme in the three
studies. In Experiment 1, expectations o f co-worker performance were inferred from
participants’ interpersonal trust levels; in Experiment 2, expectations o f co-worker
effort were manipulated by a confederate’s statement ofhis or her intended effort; in
Experiment 3, the manipulation was accomplished by a confederate’s statement with
respect to his or her ability at the task. In both experiments, productivity data were
used to confirm social loafing behavior and self-report data provided the basis for
concluding that “social compensation” accounted for the performance decrements.
The research by Sanna (1992) offers a variation on the expectations
explanation. .Sanna (1992) looked at self-efficacy and its effects on social loafing.
Specifically, Sanna (1992) incorporated the two aspects of Bandura’s (1977)
self-efficacy theory, efficacy expectancy and outcome expectancy, into two
experiments. Self-efficacy theory contends that:
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A person’s motivation is determined by two related expectancies: an efficacy
expectancy, the belief by a person that he or she is capable o f performing the
requisite behavior; and an outcome expectancy, the belief by a person that a
given behavior or set o f behaviors will lead to a given outcome (Sanna, 1992,
p. 774).
Sanna tied efficacy and outcome expectancies to social loafing through the hide
in the crowd explanation (Williams, Harkins, & Latane’, 1981) and used the Sanna and
Shotland (1990) research findings as a foundation for the connection. Recall that the
hide in-the-crowd explanation ascribes social loafing to the perception that an individual
cannot receive credit nor blame for performance because o f the absence of evaluation
and anonymity. The Sanna and Shotland (1990) findings indicate that when
individuals expected to perform well, they also expected a positive evaluation from an
audience, and performance improved relative to individuals who worked alone. But,
when individuals expected to perform poorly, they expected a negative evaluation from
an audience, and performance was impaired relative to individuals who worked alone.
With respect to social loafing, then, the typical collective work setting creates a “loose
performance-outcome contingency at best” (Sanna, 1992, p. 776).
Therefore, Sanna (1992), using a vigilance task and a word associates task,
tested contrasting predictions: an interaction ofhigh-efficacy expectancy (expected high
ability) with high-outcome expectancy (expect individual evaluation) will produce
expectations o f positive evaluation and improved social performance; whereas an
interaction o f low efficacy expectancy (expected low ability) with high-outcome
expectancy will produce expectations of negative evaluation and impaired social
performance. Performance data and self-report data were used to support the three
conclusions: (1) efficacy expectancy and outcome expectancy jointly affect individual
performance when subjects are engaged in a computer simulated vigilance task, (2)
social loafing behavior is influenced by efficacy- and outcome expectancies occurring
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jointly, and (3) social loafing behavior is a function o f the interaction between low
efficacy expectancy and high-outcome expectancy.
The output equity explanation studies suggest that social loafing behavior is a
function of (a) working co-actively in a group, (b) perceiving that another group
member is capable o f performing the task but that capable group member is not
working at his or her level o f capability, (c) preferring to fail to work at his or her level
o f capability rather than be taken advantage o f by perceived co-loafers, and (d) having a
low-efficacy expectancy together with a high-outcome expectancy.
Hide in the Crowd Explanation. Hide in the crowd/lost in the crowd social
loafing appear to be two sides o f the same coin in that they share the common property
o f causing some degree o f social loafing, however, they are subtly different With
respect to the hide-in-the-crowd explanation, when individual performance is not
explicitly identifiable, the presence o f group members provides a cover of anonymity
for the "unmotivated” individual (Williams et al., 1981). Thus, "individual outputs
were lost in the crowd, submerged in the total” (Harkins, 1987, p. 6), providing an
opportunity for the "unmotivated” individual to hide in the group and, thereby, avoid
any blame for slacking off. On the other side, the lost in the crowd explanation states
that when individual contributions to the total group effort can not be identified, loafing
is said to occur because individuals " feel lost in the crowd and unable to command their
fair share of the credit” (Brickner et al., 1986, p. 763). While both explanations are
referred to in the social psychology literature, the empirical investigations o f social
loafing as a function o f die lack o f identifiability and evaluation o f individual
performance do not make a clear distinction between the two. Therefore, for the
present purpose, both explanations will be subsumed under the hide in the crowd
explanation.
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The hide-in-the-crowd explanation of social loafing has been derived from
studies in which subjects engaged in a physical task (Kerr & Bruun, 1981; Williams et
al., 1981) and in which subjects engaged in a cognitive task (Bartis, Szymanski, &
Harkins, 1988; Earley, 1989; Harkins, 1987; Szymanski & Harkins, 1993). W hile the
focus o f these investigations was to determine the cause(s) o f social loafing behavior,
the researchers may have demonstrated that the potential for individual identification
and evaluation as an effective intervention strategy.
Performance and self-report data have been offered as support for a variety o f
hypotheses consistent with the hide-in-the-crowd explanation. For example, Williams
et al. (1981) suggest that (1) “if identifiability is the mediator, then convincing people
that their outputs are never identifiable, when they perform alone, should cause them to
perform at a consistently low level across all group sizes” (p. 307). Harkins (1987)
hypothesized that identifiability interacted with the mere presence o f others (group
size), whereas Kerr and Bruun (1981) postulated that wfor fatiguing motor tasks
subjects will take advantage o f the anonymity afforded by working in larger groups and
reduce their efforts” (p. 228). The hypotheses for social loafing involving cognitive
tasks are more complex. Earley (1989) hypothesized that:
Cultural beliefs about individualism (characteristic of U.S. workers) and
collectivism (characteristic o f Peoples Republic of China workers) would
moderate the interactive effects o f shared responsibility (working collectively in
a group) and accountability on personal performance such that foe reduced
performance associated with social loafing would occur for individuals with
highly individualistic beliefs but not for individuals with highly collectivistic
beliefs (pp. 2-3).
Finally, Szymanski and Harkins (1993), who were interested in the effects o f self
evaluation on social loafing, investigated foe notion that uthe potential for experimenter
evaluation may capture foe participants’ attention to such an extent that they disregard
foe potential for self-evaluation” (p. 274) and, therefore, tested foe "potency o f foe self
evaluation effect and foe effect o f experimenter evaluation on self evaluation” (p. 275).
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The following discussion covets one experiment employing a physical task
(Williams etal., 1981) and one experiment employing a cognitive task (Bards etal.
1988). The first o f the hide-in-the-crowd investigations was conducted by Williams et
al. (1981) who manipulated group size (alone, actual groups o f 2 and 6, pseudogroups
o f 2 and 6) and identification o f individual productivity levels to test the hypothesis that
identifiability is an important mediator o f social loafing. Using a within-subjects
design, each subject shouted as loud as they could during 5-sec trials when alone and
when in groups o f 2 and 6. Throughout the trials, subjects wore blindfolds and
earphones and, therefore, had no contact with co-workers. Identification was
manipulated through verbal instructions. Using the prototypic social loafing paradigm
to get a measure of social loafing behavior, subjects in the alone condition were told
their performance could be identified, whereas, when they shouted in the group
condition, subjects were told only the summed performance o f the group could be
tracked. To investigate the identifiability hypothesis, Williams et al. (1981) instructed
subjects in the group conditions that individual performance could be identified and
they had subjects wear individual microphones. Subjects shouted in seven
experimental conditions: alone and in groups o f 2 and 6 when individual performance
was unidentifiable; pseudogroups of 2 and 6 when individual performance was
unidentifiable; and in groups o f 2 and 6 when individual performance was identifiable.
The following data have been offered as evidence o f the hide in the crowd effect
of social loafing. First, subjects averaged 9.50 dyneVcm per trial when shouting
alone, pairs only averaged 59% o f the alone level and groups o f six averaged only
31%. In pseudogroups, subjects made 69% as much noise when they shouted in pairs
and 63% o f the alone level when they perceived they were shouting with five others.
From these data, it was concluded that social loafing had occurred and that social
loafing behavior increased with increases in group size. Second, when the identifiable
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condition groups o f two subjects shouted at 98% o f the alone level and at 92% when
shouting in groups o f 6. And, when comparing the performance o f subjects shouting
in the group-identifiable condition to that o f subjects in the group-unidentifiable
condition, the difference in performance was said to be statistically significant at
I> <.0005. Williams and his colleagues concluded that social loafing had been
discouraged by the introduction of the identifiability variable.
Bartis etal. (1988) integrated Amabile’s (1979) research on creativity into their
investigation of the hide-in-the-crowd explanation. Amabile (1979) contends that
minimizing the expectation of evaluation facilitates performance on creativity tasks.
This notion runs counter to the general hide-in-the-crowd hypothesis that the absence of
identifiability and evaluation leads to lower performance levels. Following Amabile’s
contention, Bartis et al. (1988) hypothesized that evaluation attenuates social loafing
behavior when subjects are involved in an algorithmic task and that evaluation
contributes to lowered performance levels when subjects are involved in a heuristic
task. An algorithmic task is defined as one which is routine with a straightforward
solution path and a heuristic task is defined as one that is interesting and which does not
have an obvious solution path. Thus, Bartis et al. (1988) hypothesized that evaluation
mediates social loafing behavior when subjects are involved in an algorithmic task and
that evaluation contributes to lowered performance levels when subjects are involved in
a heuristic task.
To test their hypothesis, Bartis et al. (1988) manipulated performance
evaluation (experimenter evaluation vs. no experimenter evaluation) and task type
(numbei/algorithmic vs creativity/heuristic instructions). A brainstorming task was
employed in which subjects in the number/algorithmic condition were told to generate
as many uses as possible for a knife; whereas subjects in the creativity/heuristic
condition were told to come up with creative uses for the knife and not to worry about
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the quantity o f uses they generate. Creativity points, ranging from 1 (for not at all
creative) to 11 (extremely creative) were assigned to each use by six raters. The
evaluation variable was manipulated through verbal instructions. Subjects in the
experimenter evaluation/creative task condition were told that only the experimenter
would be aware of their responses and would evaluate the level o f creativity; in the
experimenter evaluatioirtiumber task condition subjects were told only the experimenter
would know how many uses they generated; subjects in the no evaluation/ creativity
task and the no evaluation/number task conditions were told that no one would track
their individual performance. Because the researchers were not interested in social
loafing group effects, group size was not manipulated as had been the case in all the
studies which came before.
The perfotmance data indicate, at least to some extent, that the Bartis et al.
(1988) hypothesis was supported. Subjects who were given the number instructions
generated more uses in the evaluation condition (M * 22.9) then were generated in the
no evaluation condition (M = 16.6). The researchers concluded from these data that
previous loafing research had been replicated. Subjects given the creativity instructions
generated an average o f 13.4 uses in the evaluation condition and an average of 12.6
uses in the no evaluation condition. These data lead Bartis and his colleagues to
conclude there was no reliable difference in performance. With respect to creativity,
points were assigned to the uses generated in all experimental conditions. Uses
generated in the number instiuction'evaluation condition received a mean rating of 2.2
and the uses generated in the number instruction/ho evaluation condition received a
mean rating of 2.0. This difference was considered to be statistically insignificant at p
<.01. Uses generated in the creativity instruction/no evaluation condition received a
mean rating o f 3.1 and uses generated in the creativity instruction/evaluation condition
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received a mean rating o f 2.5. This difference was considered to be statistically
significant at Q <.20.
Consistent findings across the studies suggest that hide-in-the-crowd social
loafing is characterized not only by the coaction setting and group size but also by: (a)
anonymity within the group effort context, (b) absence o f individual performance
evaluation, (c) engaging in either a physical or cognitive task, and (d) group members
possessing an individualistic repertoire rather than possessing a collectivistic repertoire.
Matching to Standard Explanation. In contrast to the hide in the crowd/lost in
the crowd explanations, the matching to standard explanation suggests that
“identifiability alone may not be sufficient to eliminate loafing” and “motivation may
come from the participant’s knowledge that his or her performance can be compared to
the performances o f other participants” (Harkins & Jackson, 1985, p. 458). Put
another way, social loafing behavior is not merely a function of lack o f identifiability.
Group members must also believe that their performance can not be compared and,
therefore, can not be evaluated even if identification were possible. So if there is no
standard of comparison to determine the relative characteristics o f good or bad
performance, it does not matter whether individual outputs can be measured.
Other hypotheses have been offered. Szymanski and Harkins (1987)
hypothesized that the opportunity for self-evaluation was “motivation” enough to
eliminate social loafing and, therefore, experimenter evaluation was not necessary when
subjects are provided with a social standard (based on the average performance by
participants in a previous study) against which they could evaluate their own
performance. In contrast, Harkins and Szymanski (1988) hypothesized that the
opportunity to compare one’s performance against an objective standard (a pte
determined criterion) is sufficient to motivate performance. Finally, Harkins and
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Szymanski (1989) hypothesized that “the possibility o f group evaluation could motivate
performance in the absence o f the potential for individual-level evaluation by any
source” (p. 93S) and “the prospect o f evaluation by the experimenter would not
motivate performance at the group level” (p. 939).
A discussion o f two studies which ate illustrative o f both the identifiability
(Harkins & Jackson, 1985) and the evaluation (Szymanski & Harkins, 1987) lines of
investigation is presented. Harkins and Jackson (1985) used a brainstorming task,
generating uses for a knife, and a between-subjects design to test their identifiability
hypothesis. Subjects, in groups o f four, were assigned to one o f four experimental
conditions in which identification (individually identifiable vs pooled outputs/not
identifiable) and comparability (comparable vs. not comparable) were manipulated.
Identifiability was manipulated through verbal instructions and by having all group
members when working in the unidentifiable condition put the slips of paper containing
uses in one common box, and when working in the identifiable condition put the slips
o f paper into a designated compartment of the box. However, individual performance
in all conditions was tracked because each subject was given only a certain number of
blank slips of paper. The number o f unused slips was used to reveal the number of
uses generated. Comparability was manipulated by informing subjects that the object
for which they were generating uses was the same as (comparable) or different from
(not comparable) the object given to other members o f the group. Comparability, than,
consisted of the subject believing, because they were generating uses for the same
object, that the experimenter could compare bis or her performance level with that of
other subjects. The success of this manipulation was evaluated via self-report data.
The performance data indicated that subjects who were individually identifiable
generated more uses (M * 22.3) than subjects in the pooled, unidentifiable condition
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(M ~ 19.6). In addition, subjects who believed their performance could be compared
to others generated more uses (M * 22.4) than those who believed comparability was
not possible (M * 19.5). Harkins and Jackson concluded there was a statistically
significant main effect for identifiability and for comparability. Subjects whose outputs
were identifiable and comparable to others produced more uses (M * 24.9) than were
produced by groups of four in the pooled/comparable, pooled/not comparable, and
identifiabk/not comparable conditions. In addition, Harkins and Jackson concluded
that there was a statistically significant interaction effect (q < .05) and that the absence
of individual identifiability and opportunity for comparability of performance foster
social loafing and the presence of identifiability and comparable evaluation eliminate i t
Szymanski and Harkins (1987) used the same brainstorming task employed by
Harkins and Jackson (1985) to test their hypothesis about the sufficiency o f self
evaluation to eliminate social loafing behavior. Subjects were assigned to one o f four
experimental conditions: (1) experimenter evaluation/self-evaluation, (2) experimenter
evaluation/no self-evaluation, (3) no experimenter evaluation/self- evaluation, and (4)
no experimenter evaluatiotv'no self-evaluation. The potential for experimenter
evaluation was manipulated by telling subjects that the experimenter would count the
number o f uses, for each subject, at the end of the trial or that the experimenter would
not be able to identify individual effort The opportunity for self-evaluation also was
manipulated via verbal instructions. Subjects in the self-evaluation condition were told
that, at the end o f the trial, they would be provided with the average number o f uses
generated by subjects in a previous experiment The performance data from a previous
experiment served as the social standard. Conversely, subjects in the no self-evaluation
condition were told that “to ensure confidentiality, this information would be withheld”
(p. 893).
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Analysis o f performance data revealed differences across the four conditions.
Subjects in the experimenter evaluation/self evaluation condition generated a mean of
23.6 uses, whereas those in the experimenter evaluation/no self-evaluation condition
generated a mean o f 27.0 uses for a knife. Szymanski and Harkins (1987) concluded
that “experimenter evaluation led to equivalent performances in the self-evaluation and
no self-evaluation conditions.” (p. 896). However, means o f 23.6 and 27.0 are not
equivalent and some explanation needs to be offered for the discrepancy between the
two. Further, they concluded that these data support the notion that the “potential for
experimenter evaluation motivated performance, regardless o f the potential for self
evaluation” (p. 894). Subjects in the no experimenter evaluation/self evaluation
condition generated more uses (M = 28.6) than did subjects in the experimenter
evaluation/self-evaluation condition (M “ 23.6) and subjects in the experimenter
evaluation/no self-evaluation condition (M * 27.0). Yet, Szymanski and Harkins
(1987) concluded that “self-evaluation alone motivated participants to generate as many
uses as were generated in the experimenter evaluation conditions.” (p. 896). The data
do not support this conclusion because a mean o f 28.6 is bigger than a mean o f 23.6,
and both experimenter and self-evaluation were manipulated simultaneously, therefore,
the independent effects o f self-evaluation can not be determined from these data.
Finally, the fact that subjects in the no experimenter evaluation/no self-evaluation
condition produced far less uses (M * 16.8) than subjects in any o f the evaluation
condition lead the researchers to conclude that performance evaluation is an essential
ingredient to the elimination of social loafing.
Absence o f Personal Involvement Explanation. The absence of personal
involvement explanation contends that social loafing behavior is influenced by task
characteristics. In situations where individual efforts are pooled and, therefore,
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individual effort is masked by the group product, social loafing may occur when the
task is "intrinsically uninteresting” (Geen, 1991, p. 385) o r in "situations that subjects
find personally uninvolving” (Brickner, Harkins, & Ostrom, 1986, p. 763).
Studies by Brickner et al. (1986), George (1992), and Price (1987) have looked
at the effects o f the absence o f personal task involvement on group productivity.
Situations that individuals find personally involving are "those that have intrinsic
importance, personal meaning, or result in significant consequences for their lives”
(Brickner et al., 1986). In all these studies, personal task involvement was examined
in conjunction with the hide-in-the-crowd explanation o f social loafing. Therefore, to
some extent, identifiability played a role in the observed effects.
In three identical studies, Brickner, Harkins and Ostrom (1986) hypothesized:
That persons working on involving tasks would be willing to invest greater
amounts o f effort in the task than would persons who were unlikely to be
personally affected by task outcomes. These effects should persist even in
group situations in which participants are told that individual outputs will not be
measured (p. 764).
Further, Brickner et al. (1986) have characterized involving tasks as those which have
"future consequences for participants” (p. 764).
To test this hypothesis, undergraduate students, working in pairs, were asked
to "list the thoughts that a proposal on the introduction o f senior comprehensive exams
brought to mind” (p. 764). The proposal was considered to be of importance to
undergraduates who would be affected by the comprehensive exam requirements.
Personal task involvement was manipulated by telling subjects that the proposal was
under consideration for adoption at their school in the upcoming year (high
involvement, all replications), or that it was being considered for adoption at another
school (low involvement, replications 2 and 3), or that it was being considered for
adoption at their school in six years (low-involvement, replications 1 and 3). Subjects
recorded their opinions on separate slips o f paper and put them in tubes that went to
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collection boxes. Identifiability was manipulated by verbal instructions and by
showing subjects a collection box which either had dividers for individual performance
tracking or no compartments for the group performance condition. Subjects in the
high-identifiability condition, were told that their individual performance would be
tracked, whereas subjects in the low identifiability-pooled condition were told all
responses would be combined and presented as a group effort This study, and all the
investigations o f personal involvement, personal task involvement was examined in
conjunction with the hide-in-the-crowd explanation o f social loafing. The number of
opinions generated by each subject during a 12-min period was the primary dependent
variable, while self-report data were employed for a manipulation check. Subjects in
studies 1 and 2 were paid $3.00 for their participation.
The performance data indicated similar results for the three studies. An
interaction effect for identifiability and involvement was observed. Pairs in the low
involvement/high identifiability condition generated more thoughts (M = 8.65) than did
pairs in the low involvement'low-identifiability-pooled condition (M * 6.82). These
data were used to draw the conclusion that the Brickner et al. (1986) studies had
replicated the results o f previous loafing research. Pairs in the bigh-involvement/high
identifiability condition generated a mean o f 9.15 thoughts, which was only slightly
higher than the mean o f 8.87 thoughts generated by the high-involvemenvlow
identifiability-pooled pairs. Main effects for involvement and identifiability were found
in that pairs in the high-involvement conditions generated more thoughts (M * 9.01)
than did pairs in the low- involvement condition (M ” 7.74), and pairs in identifiability
conditions generated more thoughts (M * 8.90) than did pairs in the low-identifiability
pooled conditions (M ” 7.74).
A manipulation check was conducted using questions anchored on an 8-point
scale. In all three studies, when asked “How important is this proposal to you?”
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subjects in the high-involvement conditions repotted a mean score o f 5.93 and subjects
in the low-involvement conditions reported a mean score o f 5.38. Additionally, in
studies 2 and 3 subjects were asked "How likely is this proposal to affect you
personally?” Subjects in the high-involvement conditions rated the proposal as mote
likely to affect them personally (M * 5.88) than did subjects in the low-involvement
conditions (M * 4.36). A main affect for identifiability was not obtained in any o f the
three studies. However, post-hoc analysis showed no significant differences between
the responses of high- and low-involvement.
From the performance and self-report data, Brickner et al. (1986) drew these
conclusions:
We demonstrated the importance o f personal involvement in group situations.
When subjects thought that they were likely to be personally affected by the
outcomes o f their efforts, they did not loaf, whether or not their products were
identifiable. Participants in low-involvement conditions, on the other hand,
were willing to work only when their responses were identifiable. When they
were not, hey loafed. In the absence o f intrinsic interest, expected personal
consequences, personal meaning, or expectations o f evaluation o f individual
effort persons reduced their efforts (p. 767).
Solutions for Social Loafing
The results o f nine studies have been offered as evidence for the efficacy o f a
variety of intervention strategies. Researchers have suggested that difficult or
challenging tasks (Harkins & Petty, 1982; Jackson & Williams, 1985), punishment
(Miles & Greenberg, 1993), non-monetary incentives (Shepperd & W right, 1989) and
goal setting combined with vicarious punishment (Schnake, 1991) are useful in the
elimination of social loafing behavior.
Difficult or Challenging Tasks. In five systematic replications, Harkins and
Petty (1982) offered the general hypothesis that:
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Lack o f identifiability may not be a sufficient condition for social loafing.
Loafing may also require that subjects feel that the group task does not afford
them an opportunity to make a contribution substantial enough to warrant their
best efforts (p. 1216).
From this general hypothesis, the researchers speculated that social loafing could be
reduced either by increasing the difficulty (challenge) of the task or by giving each
subject a different task to perform, thereby, giving each group member the perception
that his or her unique talents and skills are required.
Jackson and Williams (1985) followed up the Harkins and Petty (1982) studies
by taking a different approach to the notion that working collectively can improve
performance when individuals are engaged in a difficult task. Jackson and Williams
(1985) suggest that working collectively on simple tasks “reduces the drive to exert
effort” and, therefore, “working collectively is calming” (p. 938) which leads to social
loafing. Drawing upon social facilitation theory, they suggest that increased drive leads
to poor performance on difficult tasks. So, i f “one could relax when working on a
difficult task, then presumably the opportunity for correct responses would increase.
Logically, therefore, working collectively should decrease drive, which would result in
enhanced performance on difficult tasks” (pp. 938-939). Thus, Jackson and Williams
(1985) hypothesized that working collectively would improve performance on difficult
tasks.
This experiment also differed from the Harkins and Petty (1982) investigations
with respect to the conceptualization of the social loafing paradigm. Jackson and
Williams (1985) contend that the group size manipulation in most social loafing
research does not involve an alone vs group condition. Rather, they insist that the
alone baseline condition is really a condition in which other participants are always
present and each subject’s performance is individually tracked. Therefore, the
comparisons in this study include a co-worker condition (working in pairs with
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performance individually identified) vs. a collective worker condition (working in pairs
with performance combined as a group product). Because the researchers were
simultaneously investigating social facilitation, an alone condition was also included.
However, because our interest is solely with social loafing the alone condition and
social facilitation results w ill not be considered. The group size manipulation was
crossed with a simple vs. difficult task manipulation. The task was to maneuver, as
fast as possible, a cursor through eight mazes on a computer. Simple mazes had wide
paths, a few blind alleys and obvious solution paths, whereas difficult mazes had
complex narrow paths, many blind alleys and the solution was not obvious. Because
task difficulty was a within-subject manipulation, all subjects completed both the simple
and difficult mazes with the simple and difficult mazes alternating on the computer.
The primary dependent variable was a duration measure - the time elapsed from
beginning to completion o f the eight mazes. These performance data were reported in
log-seconds per correct maneuver. A comparison of the performance in the co-work
/simple condition (M * -0.37 log seconds) with the performance of subjects in the
collective/simple condition (M * -0.23) led Jackson and Williams (1985) to conclude
that the social loafing replication was only marginal. They speculated that the lack of an
effect was due to a ceiling effect with respect to time to complete the mazes. However,
subjects in the co-workers/simple task condition, who were supposedly identifiable,
tended to perform mote quickly than did subjects in the collective/simple task condition,
who were supposedly unidentifiable. With respect to the difficult task, subjects in the
collective/difficult task condition worked faster (0.37 log seconds) than did subjects in
the co- worker/difficult task condition (0.58). These data led to the conclusion that
“working collectively enhanced performance on difficult tasks and impaired
performance on easy tasks, whereas those working co-actively performed better on
simple tasks and worse on complex tasks’*(p. 941).
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Non-Monetarv Incentives. Shepperd and Wright (1989) investigated the
usefulness o f a non-monetary incentive as a solution for social loafing. They
hypothesized that “when faced with a request to ’do your best* individuals are expected
to take into account both the costs and benefits of doing so. If available incentives
(benefits) are sufficient to justify the costs o f a best effort, then a high level o f
performance would be expected” (p. 142). To test this hypothesis, subjects working
individually and engaged in generating uses fora knife were assigned to one of four
conditions: individual/no incentive, individual/incentive, groupfao incentive, and
group/incentive. The group size manipulation involved telling subjects they alone
would be generating uses for the knife or that they would be generating uses along with
others. The incentive manipulation entailed telling subjects that they would be given an
incentive if they generated as many uses as they were capable of based upon their best
effort. The incentive was the opportunity to leave the experiment early and, thereby,
avoid a tedious memorization task later in the session.
The performance data were as expected. Subjects in the individual/no incentive
condition generated more uses than did subjects in the group/no incentive condition.
These data were considered indicative o f social loafing in that subjects whose efforts
were not identifiable put forth less effort than subjects who could be identified.
Subjects in the group/incentive condition performed better than did subjects in the
group/ho incentive condition leading to the conclusion “as predicted, anonymous group
members will not reduce their efforts when there is sufficient justification for a high
level of effort” (p. 147).
As with many other investigations o f social loafing this study relied heavily on
self-report data to infer the cause o f social loafing behavior. For example, the
differences between mean responses to a questionnaire item regarding the sufficiency o f
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the incentive were sited as proof that the value of the incentive eliminated social loafing
behavior in the groujylncentive condition. A comparison o f mean responses (on a 9
point Likert scale) for subjects in the group/no incentive condition (M * 4.60) and for
subjects in the group/incentive (M - 6.00). These two means are not that different, yet,
the performance data (M « 18.9 vs. M * 26.85) clearly show that performance was
better when subjects were promised a performance incentive.
Punishment. Miles and Greenberg (1993) took the investigation o f cures for
social loafing into the widely studied area o f punishment, a stimulus that is often
associated with inadequate performance. The researchers investigated the effects o f
punishment threats on relay swimming performance by high school students. Two
hypotheses were offered: (1) when punishment threats are not given, subjects will
swim more slowly when performing as members o f four-person groups than when
swimming as lone individuals, and (2) when punishment threats are given, subjects
will swim equally fast when swimming as lone individuals as when swimming as
members o f four-person groups.
Two independent variables, performance setting and punishment, were
manipulated. The performance setting involved subjects being assigned to either an
individual or a group condition. Subjects in the individual condition were assigned to a
group o f four swimmers but individual performance (in seconds) was tracked on
swimming 100 yards freestyle. In the group condition, the time for all four members to
swim 100 yards freestyle each was the measure of interest There were three levels o f
the punishment variable: none (no punishment was threatened); moderate (swimming
four freestyle laps * 200 yards); severe (swimming eight freestyle laps * 400 yards).
Punishment would be given for failure to reach the pre-established performance goal.
The goal for individuals was 1 minute 8 seconds and the goal for the groups was 4
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minutes 32 seconds ( 4 x i minute 8 seconds). These manipulations resulted in six
experimental conditions: individual without punishment; group without punishment;
individual with moderate punishment; group with moderate punishment; individual with
severe punishment; group with severe punishment.
The performance data were mixed with respect to the hypotheses. First,
subjects in the individual/no punishment condition (1 min 6.3 sec) swam faster than
subjects in the group/no punishment condition (1 min 13.49 sec), leading Miles and
Greenberg to conclude that social loafing had occurred and hypothesis 1 was
supported. Second, performance in the individual/moderate punishment condition (1
min 8.33 sec) and in the group/moderate condition (1 min 9.31) were comparable,
resulting in the conclusion that hypothesis 2 was supported. However, a reverse effect
was observed in the severe punishment conditions where subjects in the individual/
severe punishment condition (1 min 10.19 sec) performed worse than subjects in the
group/severe punishment condition (I min 4.8 sec).
There are some additional, and perhaps more interesting, data which should
have been discussed. First, with respect to the punishment variable, there was a
reverse effect between the individual and group conditions. In the individual
conditions, the greater the punishment the poorer the performance. In the group
conditions, the greater the punishment the better the performance. Second, in all but
one o f the punishment conditions (group/severe), the goals were not achieved,
therefore, punishment would have been delivered. So, while it may be that the threat o f
punishment influenced better performance in the group/severe condition and equal
performance in the individual/ moderate and group/moderate conditions, the fact
remains that threats of punishment did not lead to reaching the performance standard for
many swimmers. These two points are particularly important to OBM practitioners
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who are seeking solutions to performance deficiencies associated with the social loafing
phenomenon.
Goal Setting and Vicarious Punishment Unlike Miles and Greenberg (1993),
Schnake (1991) explicitly manipulated goal-setting and vicarious punishment in his
investigation o f solutions to social loafing as described by the output equity
explanation, more specifically as a function of the sucker effect Much like Jackson
and Harkins (1985), Schnake conceptualized social loafing as an expectancy that
co-workers will loaf, so the individual reduces his or her efforts to achieve some equity
in effo rt In the present study, Schnake speculated that "social cues’*from group
members could create such an expectancy and that goal-setting and punishment could
turn such social loafing off. More specifically, he made three hypotheses: (1) negative
social cues that suggest that the co-worker intends to withhold effort will have a
detrimental effect on quantitative task performance, (2) challenging goals will offset the
effects o f negative social cues on quantitative task performance, and (3) vicarious
punishment will offset the effects of negative social cues on quantitative task
performance.
Summary. All o f the social loafing studies taken together make some general
conclusions possible. First, decrement in individual performance appears to occur
when people work coactively in groups (the efforts of 2 or more individuals is summed
and presented as the collective efforts o f the group). Second, this social loafing
behavior seems to generalize to physical tasks (such as shouting, hand-clapping,
pumping air, blowing air, freestyle swimming), cognitive tasks (such as brainstorming
uses for objects, solving computer mazes, completing in-basket items) and combined
cognitive-physical tasks (such as a computer vigilance task). Third, additive,
disjunctive and conjunctive tasks seem to be susceptible to social loafing. Fourth,
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social loafing has been observed in real groups o f people ranging from 2 to 10 and in
pseudogroups o f up to lOpeople. Fifth, the degree o f social loafing appears to
increase as group size (and pseudo-group size) increases with groups of two working
atonlya71% level o f alone subjects and groups o f six generating effort at only 40% of
the alone level. This only holds for groups up to 6 members. Sixth, social loafing
behavior appears to occur with male and female undergraduate students, high school
age swimmers, and managerial trainees in the United States. Seventh, social loafing
may be more likely to occur with individuals who have been exposed to an
individualistic rather than collectivistic culture. Eighth, consequences such as
punishment and incentives may be effective intervention strategies.
While these findings have utility in that they provide more information about the
variables that impact upon behavior in group environments, from a practical and
behavior analytic perspective, these studies have not answered real world questions
about social loafing behavior. First, the theories o f causation have been built,
primarily, upon self-report data. While subjective data may be a useful supplement to
objective data, they are no substitute. Functional relations only can be derived from
objective evaluation o f behavior as it occurs (Skinner, 19S3).
The second problem is that the vast majority of the studies analyzed behavior
with between-subjects comparisons. In a few cases the group-size IV was arranged as
a within-subject manipulation, however, only 2 to 4 data points were collected in each
phase and the unit of analysis was group performance. The use o f a within-subjects
design to assess social loafing in the laboratory has practical benefits for the real world
and is consistent with the recommendation by Balcazar, Hopkins and Suarez (1989)
that "future simulation studies should better reflea the Journal o f Organization Behavior
Management's historic tradition o f within subject (group) designs” (p. 35). It is
typically difficult to employ a between-subjects design in an organization (Komaki,
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1982): (a) an equivalent control group Is difficult to achieve, particularly in smaller
organizations, and (b) collateral negative effects are often generated when one group of
employees receives a treatment and the control group does n o t This is especially the
case when reward systems and monetary incentives constitute the intervention strategy.
The use of a within-subjects design obviates both problems in that in-tact groups can
serve as their own control group, and all subjects in the experiment ate exposed to all
treatment levels. Also, the use o f within-subjects designs has an especially important
benefit when working with small-businesses in that large numbers o f employees are not
needed to demonstrate an effect Finally, tracking individual performance over time can
reveal important temporal aspects o f social loafing and provide answers to such
questions as: “Does social loafing occur immediately upon being placed in a group
coaction setting or does it arise gradually and grow in strength the longer the individual
is exposed to the group contingencies?’' "Does social loafing occur continuously after
the first instance or is it cyclic?”
The third problem concerns external validity. The generality of the results from
the social loafing research is limited given that none of the studies were designed to be
laboratory analogues o f the real world. Simulation of the essential aspects (i.e., work
tasks and physical work environment) o f the real world better insures generalization to
those settings (Barlow & Hersen, 1984; Dickinson, 1991). Many o f the studies
employed such performance tasks as shouting "Rah Rah”, clapping hands, and air
pumping. While these tasks could be viewed as analogues o f physically demanding
work tasks, the actual environments in which such behaviors would likely occur were
not arranged in the laboratory setting. Only three social loafing studies (Earley, 1989;

Miles & Greenberg, 1993; Schnake, 1991) attempted to simulate the context in which
the performance task would likely occur. Conversely, it seems that painstaking effort
was taken to control for contextual factors. For example, Latane’ et al. (1979) had
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subjects wear headphones and blindfolds so that subjects could not hear nor see others
in their group, and Harkins and Petty (1982) placed partitions between workers. This
was done to prevent subjects from being influenced by the performance o f others in
theirgroup. While it is always a good thing to eliminate confounding variables, in this
case the experimental controls eliminated an essential aspect of the work environment
that is always present when people work in groups. Given that the environmental
context in which social loafing behavior occurs was not addressed, the contingency
arrangement that constitutes the functional relation o f social loafing has not been
investigated.
Rationale for the Current Study
While the utility o f the social psychology literature is questionable, it seems
reasonable to conclude, given the plethora of research on the topic and the growth of
the teamwork concept, that organizations wishing to use teams to improve performance
should give some attention to social loafing. However, after an extensive literature
search across the fields o f management and organizational behavior management, only
one study on social loafing and teams was uncovered. The article, by George (1992),
appeared in the Journal o f the Academ y o f Management, and was an investigation of
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation as a source of social loafing. This was a correlational
study with findings that relied upon self-report data.
Given the current trend o f industry toward teamwork and the use o f group
incentive pay systems, the potential that social loafing exists in the real world, and the
fact that monetary incentives effectively increase productivity when individuals are
working alone and with others, an empirical investigation o f the effects o f monetary
incentives on social loafing using behavior analytic technology is a logical step. The
current study, by addressing the group phenomenon o f social loafing, provides
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valuable information to designers o f incentive pay systems and to organizations with
team cultures.
This study is a systematic extension o f the previous incentive pay system
studies conducted by Smoot and Duncan (1997). The current study brought together
the fields o f teamwork, management, social psychology and behavior analysis to
answer questions that are critical to designing a work environment that supports
performance improvements. Consistent with those earlier studies, this study employs a
laboratory analogue of the real world. Generally, by employing tasks and work
conditions that simulate a real work environment, the study takes the first step to
determining whether social loafing occurs in the real world of work and, if it does
occur, what effects incentive pay systems have on social loafing behaviors. Because
there is no evidence that social loafing actually exists in the real world, there was a
possibility that social loafing will not occur in this study. However, the results o f this
study can still be useful to those involved in designing monetary incentive systems.
The data on the group and individual incentive pay conditions provide additional
information on the characteristics o f the optimum monetary incentive pay system.
Specifically, this study sought to answer seven research questions. First, does
social loafing (decrement in individual performance when working in a group coaction
setting) occur when a group o f 3 workers engaged in a simple construction task are
paid a flat, hourly-type rate? Second, if social loafing occurs what effect will group
monetary incentives have on social loafing behavior when the incentives are paid as an
equal-share o f the group’s total earnings? Third, if social loafing does not occur will
equal-share group incentives have any effect on individual performance beyond that
observed when subjects received flat pay while working in a group coaction setting?
Fourth, if social loafing occurs what effect will individual monetary incentives have on
social loafing behavior when incentive pay is based solely on individual widget
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production? Fifth, if social loafing does not occur will individual incentives have any
effect on individual performance beyond that observed when subjects received flat pay
while working alone? Sixth, which monetary incentive system, linear (group
equal-share or individual payout), positive acceleration (group equal-share or individual
payout), negative acceleration (group equal-share or individual payout), is better at
managing performance improvements? Seventh, which monetary incentive system,
linear (group equal-share or individual payout), positive acceleration (group equal-share
or individual payout), negative acceleration (group equal-share or individual payout), is
most cost effective?
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subjects
The investigator received permission from the Human Subjects Institutional
Review Board (HSIRB) o f Western Michigan University to employ human subjects for
the completion of this study. A copy o f the HSIRB’s approval form is included as
Appendix A.
Eighteen subjects were recruited from psychology classes at a large midwestem
university. In each class, the investigator read a recruitment script which informed
students o f the purpose o f the study, described the experimental task and detailed
participation requirements. In addition, the voluntary nature o f participation, the right
to withdraw at any time without any penalty, and the measures taken to protect the
privacy o f subjects were emphasized. Subjects were also told that they would be paid
for their participation (compensation would be determined by the subject’s
performance) and that subjects completing the study would receive a fifteen dollar
bonus plus an additional ten dollars for participation in a debriefing session. Interested
subjects were asked to write their name and telephone number on a sheet o f paper and
to indicate which of three experimental session times they preferred. Potential subjects
were also told to expect a telephone call from the investigator to schedule a recruitment
interview. The recruitment script is presented in Appendix B.
The recruitment interview was a four-step process. The initial step involved
screening subjects on three criteria: (1) availability during the specified work times for
56
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the duration o f the study, (2) self-reported financial need (to assess potential sensitivity
to the reward value o f the monetary incentives), and (3) self-reported absence o f
personal friends who had volunteered for the study (to avoid confounding o f results
from extra experimental competitive contingencies). Subject availability was assessed
by vetbally verifying that the volunteers were, in fact, available at the times they
indicated on the initial sign-up form. Financial need and knowledge o f personal friends
who had volunteered for the study were assessed by having volunteers complete an
eight item screening questionnaire. The questionnaire is presented in Appendix C.
Volunteers who were unavailable during the specified dates and times for the duration
of the study were eliminated from the subject pool prior to administering the
questionnaire. O f the remaining pool, subjects who expressed financial need were
included in the study. I f any o f these subjects identified a friend who had volunteered
for the study, and who had been selected based on the screening criteria, the friend
would be assigned to a different experimental group.
Interested subjects who passed the initial screening participated in the second
step of the recruitment interview which involved a demonstration o f the experimental
task by the investigator. Subjects were told that participation in the study required them
to make pop bead widgets during twenty-five, 15-minute sessions. They were then
asked if they were still interested in participating. Eighteen subjects indicated they were
interested and were passed on to the third step.
During the third-step o f the recruitment interview, the eighteen subjects were
given an informed consent form and asked to read it and to indicate their acceptance of
the conditions o f the study by signing the form. All subjects signed the form. A copy
of the informed consent form is included as Appendix D.
The final step involved giving each subject a sheet o f paper indicating the date
and time of the first experimental session. The sheet also contained the name and
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telephone number o f the Investigator. Subjects were asked to contact the investigator if
the subject decided to withdraw from the study prior to the first experimental session.
While recruitment was conducted to target both women and men, only women
passed the three screening criteria. Therefore, all the subjects for this study were
women, yet, there was diversity among the eighteen women. Two subjects were
international students, two were occupational therapy majors, two were business
majors, eight were psychology majors and six subjects were undecided about their
major.
Two subjects withdrew during the study. Even though subjects indicated their
availability for the duration o f the study, one subject withdrew after the twelfth session
citing conflicts between experimental sessions and academic commitments. Another
subject withdrew after the eighth session because of a chronic illness. The remaining
sixteen subjects completed the study.
Task Description and Setting
The performance task consisted o f subjects constructing “widgets” from
colored, plastic pop beads. This task was employed in a series of four studies on
incentive pay systems conducted by Smoot and Duncan (1997), and the replication o f
the task in the present study provided consistency when conducting an overall
evaluation of the findings o f all studies in the series. A pop bead is a spherical object
approximately 2.5 centimeters in circumference with a small hole on one side and a
small nipple on the other side. A widget is constructed by joining the beads together
into a circle. The beads are joined together by inserting the nipple of one bead into the
hole of another bead. A correctly made widget consists o f 16 beads, 8 white, 4 blue,
and 4 purple. Each subject, whether working in the individual or group coaction
setting, received 3 containers o f pop beads. However, to track individual performance
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during the group coaction flat pay condition (Phase B) and group coaction incentive
pay condition (Phase C), without subjects being aware, the purple beads were
inconspicuously coded. A small dot o f permanent paint was placed on the nipple o f
each bead. Each subject in the group was assigned a different paint color (blue, green
or orange).
The present study was conducted in an experimental lab. During the group
coaction conditions, subjects worked around a large table. Subjects working in the
individual conditions worked at a table in a laboratory cubicle or at a work session
isolated from other work stations by wooden partitions.
Dependent Variables
The primary dependent variable was the number of correctly made widgets in
each work session within each pay condition. A secondary dependent variable was the
cost-per widget in each pay condition. According to Poling, Smith, and Braatz (1993),
cost-beneflt analyses are useful in determining the effectiveness of the intervention and
should be included in all applied investigations. The inclusion of a cost-beneflt
analysis also seems appropriate when advocating the use of individual monetary
incentive pay plans as solutions to productivity problems and the declining position o f
the United States in the world market. This necessity for cost-beneflt analyses o f
interventions is supported by Blinder (1990) who states:
If we could figure out a way to make labor 10 percent more efficient, so that an
hour o f labor time would accomplish what now takes 66 minutes, output per
.hour of work would rise by about 7 percent with no increase in capital (p. 2).
The results of a questionnaire administered to subjects at the conclusion o f the
study, during a formal debriefing session, comprised a third dependent variable. The
debriefing script is presented in Appendix E. A copy of the questionnaire is included
as Appendix F. Analysis o f subject responses on the questionnaire was intended to
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serve four purposes: (1) to yield a measure of social validity with respect to the
research methodology employed in the present study, (2) to provide a manipulation
check, (3) to provide supplemental data to the empirical evidence, and (4) to provide a
measure o f the extent to which subjects viewed the experimental situation as a
simulated work environment The analysis of social validity could be useful to making
refinements in future replications and extensions o f the present study. With respect to
the manipulation check, responses provide a means for determining whether subjects
were aware that individual performance was being tracked during the group coaction
conditions and that one purpose of the study was to investigate social loafing behavior.
I f subjects were aware, then any changes in productivity during the intervention phases
cannot be attributed solely to the independent variable(s) o f interest. In terms of the
supplemental data, it was believed that the self-report data regarding preference for
working alone or in groups, characteristics o f the pay system and usage o f earnings
(compared to the financial need data obtained during the subject screening process)
would aid in the detection o f motivation level differences between subjects. Given that
the external validity o f the results o f the present study are, to some extent, dependent
upon a laboratory analogue o f the real world o f work, assessing the degree to which
subjects considered their participation as real work in a real work setting was
important.
Independent Variables
The independent variables were the work setting and the system by which
workers were paid. The work setting variable consisted o f subjects working alone and
in groups o f three. Because the present study was a systematic extension o f the
previous incentive pay system studies the pay systems were identical to those employed
in the Smoot and Duncan (1997) studies. The pay system variable consisted o f four
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pay systems each with an individual and group equal-share payout: (1) flat fate per
work session, (2) linear incentive, (3) positively accelerating, and (4) negatively
accelerating. In addition to being described below, the pay scales for the three
incentive systems are presented in Appendix G and the pay curves associated with the
three incentive systems are graphically illustrated in Figure 1.
Flat Pay Pgf_W9ik.$wgigQ
Each subject received $2.00 per work session in Phase A (individual work
setting) provided the subject produced at least 10 correct widgets, and in Phase B
(group coaction setting) provided the total group productivity equaled at least 10
widgets per group member. For example, when working in the individual setting if the
subject did not produce at least 10 widgets the subject received no pay for the session.
When working in the group setting in phase B, the total productivity for the group had
to equal at least 30 widgets for any group member to be paid for the session. The
group pay contingency was included in the Phase B flat pay condition for two reasons:
(1) to create the contingency arrangement typically present when social loafing
behavior, as described by Latane* et a l (1979), occurs; and (2) to provide appropriate
comparison data to evaluate the benefits o f group payouts within the three incentive pay
systems.
Flat pay o f $2.00 per session during Phases A and B, which were compared to
determine if social loafing occurred, was used to hold pay constant between the two
phases and among subjects. The existence o f differential pay in either phase would
likely have been confounded with the performance data and would have rendered the
measures o f social loafing behavior useless.
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Figure 1. Incentive Pay System Curves.
Lincar.Incentivc Pav System
In Phases C and D subjects in two of the six groups were paid under the linear
incentive pay system and received $.10 for each correctly constructed widget In the
Smoot and Duncan (1997) studies, the linear pay o f $.10 per widget proved to be
moderately effective in increasing widget production, therefore there was reason to
believe that the linear incentive system would reduce or eliminate social loafing
behavior. In the Phase D group coaction setting, subjects were paid an equal share of
the group’s total earnings provided that total group productivity averaged at least 10
widgets per subject Given that social loafing is characterized by behavior occurring
when individuals work in a coaction environment, the inclusion o f this group pay
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contingency was essential to determining the benefits o f having individuals work in a
coaction situation when they were paid group contingent incentives. In the Phase C
alone setting, subjects received incentive pay based on individual performance provided
the subject produced at least 10 widgets.
Positively Accelerating Pav System
Subjects in two other groups were paid under the positively accelerating pay
system during Phases C and D. The positively accelerating pay curve is based on
gradual increases in the value o f each additional widget and, therefore, subjects
received somewhat more for each additional widget they produced. For example, the
tenth widget may be worth $.06 and the eleventh worth $.063. The Phase C and D
payout arrangements were identical to those for the linear pay system.
Negatively Accelerating Pav System

Subjects in the final two groups were paid under the negatively accelerating pay
system during Phases C and D. The negatively accelerating pay curve is based on
gradual decreases in the value o f each additional widget and, therefore, subjects were
paid somewhat less for each additional widget they produced. For example, the tenth
widget may be worth $.06 and the eleventh worth $.057. The individual and group
payouts under the negatively accelerating system were the same as the payout
arrangements for the other incentive pay systems.
The 10-widget minimum, which was required in all pay systems, was
determined from the results o f the Leary et al. (1990) study which employed the same
widget-making task used in the present study. Subjects, without any experience in
constructing widgets from pop beads, averaged 16 to 24 widgets per session over the
first five sessions o f the study. Therefore, it was determined that any subject should be

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

able to complete at least 10 widgets per session beginning with the first session o f the
study.
Minimum productivity requirements seem to have become a standard in
monetary incentive research. For example, Stoneman and Dickinson (1989) required
subjects to assemble a minimum o f 58 parts to receive base pay, Frisch and Dickinson
(1990) set a minimum work level o f 50 quality parts, and Dickinson and Gillette (1993)
established minimum performance as 1000 processed checks per work session.
In addition, the three incentive pay systems were designed to pay $2.00 for
twenty widgets. This was done to establish equity, at the average performance level,
across the flat and incentive pay systems. Therefore, subjects making twenty widgets,
regardless o f pay system, would be paid $2.00. The twenty-widget average
performance level came from the results o f the Leary et al. (1990) study which
indicated that for most subjects twenty widgets was average. Also, this design
characteristic was consistent with what was done in the Dickinson and Gillette (1993)
where average performance o f 1300 checks per session paid the same amount across
the base pay and incentive systems.
Experimental Design
A within-subject, multiple-baseline design with counterbalancing (Barlow &
Hetsen, 1984; Komaki, 1982), see Figure 2, was adopted to assess the independent
variables. The within-subject manipulation consisted of exposing all subjects to all
levels o f the independent variable and tracking performance within and across all
conditions. Specifically, the multiple-baseline manipulation involved temporally
staggering the introduction o f the next phase in the sequence across the two yoked
groups after the stability criteria were achieved in the previous phase. The multiple
baseline configuration was included so that an accurate assessment of the intervention
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could be made. If performance changes after, and not prior to, the intervention phase
and the change occurs for both groups at different times, then the evidence supporting
the effects o f the intervention are mote compelling (Johnston & Pennypacker, 1980).
Counterbalancing was achieved by reversing the sequence o f the introduction of
the incentive pay phases across the six groups. For example, with respect to the two
linear incentive groups, the Phase C group equal-share incentive condition was
introduced immediately after Phase B for one group; whereas the Phase D individual
incentive condition was introduced immediately after Phase B for the other group. The
counterbalancing configuration was included for the incentive phases to prevent threats
to internal validity from intervention sequence effects (Komaki, 1982). Comparison of
the Phase A and B manipulations yielded a measurement o f social loafing consistent
with the Latane’ et al. (1979) definition o f social loafing as diminished productivity
when individuals ate placed in a coaction environment after working alone. Therefore,
Phases A and B were not counterbalanced.
Prior to the initial work session, subjects were assigned to one o f six
three-member experimental groups. Assignment to the groups was dictated by the time
of day that the subject was available for the study, therefore, random assignment to the
groups was not possible. The groups were randomly assigned to one o f the three
incentive pay conditions which resulted in the linear groups being run at 9:00 a.m.,
positively accelerating groups being run at 10:00 a.m., and negatively accelerating
groups being tun at 11:00 a.m. on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday.
.The experiment consisted o f four phases with Phases B, C and D comprising
the intervention conditions. Phase A was the baseline condition in which subjects
worked alone and received flat pay o f $2.00 per session. All subjects began in Phase
A and changed to the next phase when subject performance met the stability criteria.
The stability criteria, which consisted o f a minimum number of sessions within the
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condition and a performance stability criterion, was applied to all experimental phases.
Previous studies by Smoot and Duncan (1997) showed that performance on the
widget-making task typically stabilized within five to seven experimental sessions
regardless o f the pay system in effect. Therefore, subjects in the present study were
required to complete at least five sessions under each pay system.
In addition, group performance was considered to be stabilized when there was
no greater than 5% variability across the last 2 data points within the phase. This
stability criterion was consistent with that applied in the previous Smoot and Duncan
(1997) studies and similar to that employed in die Dickinson (1991) study on monetary
incentives. This criterion was applied to the group productivity rather than that of
individual subjects because o f the need to move all subjects assigned to a particular
group to the next phase simultaneously. So, for example, even though the 5% stability
criterion was not met by all members o f linear group 1 during Phase C the group’s
performance met the stability criterion.
The 5% stability criterion was adjusted during the course o f the study to include
an accommodation for downward trends over the last 2 sessions. Given the need to
have at least S sessions within each experimental condition, in some instances the
introduction o f the next condition could not be delayed beyond a certain number of
sessions. Therefore, if the group’s productivity did not meet the 5% stability criterion
but did show a downward trend the next condition was introduced.
Phase B consisted o f the subjects being moved from the alone work setting into
a group coaction work setting in which they were paid a flat rate for the session
contingent upon the total group’s productivity teaching the minimum performance
level. While productivity was reported to subjects as the group’s total productivity,
individual performance was tracked covertly so that social loafing comparisons could
be made. The average number of widgets produced by each subject and the group in
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Phase B were compared to the average number produced by each subject and the group
in Phase A to provide an answer to research question#!: “Does social loafing occur
when a group o f three workers engaged in a simple construction task are paid a flat,
hourly-type rate?"
Phase C and D represented the incentive pay conditions. In Phase C subjects
worked alone and were paid monetary incentives based solely on individual
performance. Hereafter, Phase C is referred to as the incentive individual condition.
This pay condition was included to assess the effects o f individual incentives on
performance when compared to performance under a flat individual pay system. A
comparison o f productivity during Phase A and Phase C provided an answer to
research question #4: “If social loafing occurs, what effect will individual monetary
incentives have on social loafing behavior when incentive pay is based solely upon
individual widget production?” The same comparison provided an answer to research
question #5: “I f social loafing does not occur will individual incentives have any effect
on individual performance beyond that observed when subjects received flat pay while
working alone?"
For Phase D, subjects worked in the group coaction setting and received an
equal-share o f the group’s total incentive pay. As was the case with Phase B, widget
productivity was reported to subjects as the group’s total effort, however, each
subject's productivity was tracked covertly to provide data on individual performance.
Hereafter, Phase D is referred to as the incentive group condition. A comparison o f
productivity during Phase B and Phase D provided an answer to research question #2:
“If social loafing occurs what effects will group monetary incentives have on social
loafing behavior when the incentives are paid as an equal-share o f the group’s total
earnings?" In addition, the same comparison provided an answer to research question
#3: “I f social loafing does not occur will equal-share group incentives have any effect
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on individual performance beyond that observed when subjects received flat pay while
working in a group coaction setting?”
Research question #6 was “Which monetary incentive system, linear (group
equal-share or individual payout), positively accelerating (group equal-share or
individual payout), negatively accelerating (group equal-share or individual payout), is
better at managing performance improvements?” This question was answered through
comparisons o f average widget productivity during the individual and group
conditions.
Research question #7 addressed the cost effectiveness issue by asking, “Which
monetary incentive system, linear (group equal-share or individual payout), positive
acceleration (group equal-share or individual payout), negative acceleration (group
equal-share or individual payout) is most cost effective?” An answer was provided by
comparing the cost per widget for each pay system.
Procedure
Because the overall purpose of this study was to investigate the effects o f
monetary incentives on social loafing behavior characteristic of real world work
environments, the laboratory environment was designed to resemble, as much as
possible given the physical and budgetary constraints o f the present research, the real
world o f work. The simulation consisted o f arranging eight variables that ate typically
found in a work setting. First, subjects were required to report for work at the same
specified time each day and were required to produce a minimum level o f work in order
to be paid. These requirements are typical o f any employment setting where
maintaining a certain level o f productivity is necessary to continued employment.
Second, failure to report to work resulted in no pay for the day. This contingency
arrangement was similar to that found in a “paid-by-the hour” or “paid-by-the-piece”
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employment situation. Third, the production task o f constructing widgets was not
unlike piece work. Fourth, subjects arriving late to work were permitted to enter the
work session and were not systematically penalized for tardiness nor were they given
extra time. However, there was a naturally occurring penalty in that subjects arriving
late typically produced fewer widgets, thereby, earning less pay. In the group flat pay
and incentive conditions, tardiness translated to lower overall group productivity and
less or no pay for each group member.
The fifth component o f the simulation was allowing subjects to engage in
alternative activities and some activities were arranged by the investigator. This aspect
o f the simulation was included because in a real workplace people typically have
access to activities other than those associated with the work task. Another reason is
that Dickinson and Gillette (1993) have suggested that the inclusion o f competitive
activities allows for a more accurate evaluation o f the effectiveness o f incentive pay
systems. Therefore, subjects were not prohibited from engaging in alternative activities
and were permitted to bring items such as reading materials and food to work sessions.
In addition, the investigator placed magazines, the daily newspaper and small games at
each work station and a telephone was easily accessible to all subjects. Also, snacks
were provided and subjects could partake of coffee, juice and cookies before, during
and after each work session. Sixth, subjects were asked to sign a form verifying the
number o f widgets produced and the amount earned per work session. This
verification served much the same purpose as an employee’s signature on a time card.
Seventh, subjects were paid weekly (or at the end o f an experimental condition) and
were asked to verify receipt o f their pay. Eighth, subjects and research assistants were
not prohibited from interacting with each other. In a typical work place, workers
interact with each other and with supervisors.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The investigator was assisted by three two-member teams comprised o f
advanced psychology undergraduates who were required to successfully complete a
one-hour training session. During the training session assistants were familiarized with
the experimental task, subject instructions, pay system instructions, data collection
procedures, subject pay calculation, and subject payment procedures. Standardization
and consistency o f instruction and treatment delivery were also emphasized. Because
prior studies using pop bead widgets have shown that a seventeen-bead widget is
frequently counted as correct (a correct widget has sixteen beads) when counting
quickly, research assistants received training in counting-techniques. These previous
studies yielded three simple methods for spotting incorrectly constructed widgets: (1)
disconnecting the widget prior to counting, (2) disconnecting all widgets between the
fourth and fifth white beads, and (3) laying all disconnected widgets side-by-side in the
same order o f color. The training consisted o f the investigator constructing a number
o f correct and incorrect widgets, demonstrating the three counting-techniques, and then
observing the research assistants during a simulation o f two work sessions. When the
performance by all assistants was accurate and thorough, the investigator determined
they were adequately prepared to conduct the experimental sessions. To further ensure
the integrity o f the interventions, the investigator was present at all experimental
sessions conducted by the research assistants.
On the first day o f the study all subjects were read standard instructions on how
the work sessions would be conducted and on how subjects would be paid. This was
followed by a demonstration o f the construction of a correct widget. Subjects indicated
that they clearly understood the procedures and the performance task. Immediately
prior to the beginning of each experimental session the research assistant read a
description o f the pay system in effect for the session and asked if subjects had any
questions regarding the pay system. A copy o f the pay condition scripts are presented
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in Appendix H. To protect the integrity o f the group pay manipulation during the
group equal-share condition subjects were instructed to place all widgets in a pile in the
middle o f the work table. In addition, during the incentive pay conditions subjects
were given a copy o f the relevant pay scale. Given that subjects in the linear pay
condition could easily keep track of their earnings throughout the session, allowing
subjects in the positively and negatively accelerating pay conditions to see their pay
scale held constant any self-administered feedback about productivity and eamings.
Finally, subjects were instructed to begin working and the research assistant
immediately started a timer for each group. At the end o f 15 minutes the research
assistant instructed all subjects to stop working and the research team made a visual
inspection to assure that all subjects did so.
At the conclusion o f each experimental session, research assistants performed
the data collection activities. Independent verification o f productivity levels and
eamings by each member o f the research assistant team was performed to assure
interobserver agreement. Upon entering the experimental room the research assistant
retrieved the pay scale sheets and, then, in the presence o f the subjects counted the
number o f correctly made widgets. At that point the second member o f the research
assistant team repeated the procedure by independently counting the widgets. When
the two assistants reached agreement on the number of correctly made widgets, the
number o f widgets was recorded on the “group productivity and pay record” (see
Appendix I) during the group payout conditions and on the “individual productivity and
pay record” (see Appendix J) during individual payout conditions.
A similar procedure was followed when calculating and recording earnings for
the session. After the research assistants reached agreement on the productivity level,
one assistant consulted the appropriate pay scale to determine the amount o f pay for
each subject and, then, obtained agreement from the other assistant The subjects’
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eamings were recorded on the appropriate productivity and pay record. Prior to
dismissing the subjects, the assistant obtained each subject’s signature on the form
verifying agreement
Because tracking o f individual productivity during group conditions was
performed covertly an additional data collection step was necessary. After subjects
were dismissed, research assistants determined the individual productivity data for
subjects in the group coaction conditions. One assistant counted the number o f widgets
made by each subject by inspecting the code (dot o f paint) on the purple pop beads.
The other assistant independently repeated this procedure. When agreement between
the two assistants was reached the number o f widgets was recorded on the individual
productivity and pay form.
Subjects received cash and typically were paid weekly. After the Wednesday
work session, the primary investigator summarized each subject’s weekly productivity
data and eamings and recorded them on the “pay summary form” (see Appendix K).
Envelopes containing the subject’s eamings and the pay summary form were prepared
for distribution prior to the beginning o f the following Monday work session. Subjects
were asked to count their eamings and verify receipt by initialing the pay summary
form. When subjects were absent from the Monday work session, the subject’s pay
was held until she returned to work.
A deviation from the weekly pay schedule occurred when pay conditions
changed during, and not at the end of, any week. To avoid any confounding o f results
that could occur from including money earned in two different pay conditions in the
same “paycheck,” subjects were paid prior to the beginning o f the first experimental
session in the new pay condition.
An additional data collection activity involved research assistants systematically
observing subjects and recording any instances o f non-widget making activities.
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Guerin (personal communication, December 15, 1995) has suggested that the reason
social loafing experiments have isolated group members from each other is to eliminate
social interaction as a confounding variable. Guerin’s hypothesis is that engaging in
behaviors other than the task at hand may interfere with performance and could account
for any performance decrements in the flat group condition. As such, any decrement in
group performance can not be attributed to social loafing. Given that simulation o f the
work context was an important aspect o f the current study, the elimination o f contact
with other people, an environmental variable that is always present in the work place,
would have jeopardized the success o f the simulation and the generalization o f results.
Thus, a better choice was to track and account for the potential influence o f social
interaction with others.
Each instance o f off-task behavior was recorded on the “OfF-Task Behavior
Form” (see Appendix L). Documentation included a detailed description o f the off-task
behavior, the point in the 15-minute session at which the behavior occurred, and the
frequency of occurrence.
At the end o f each experimental session, all data collection forms were reviewed
by the investigator for accuracy and thoroughness. Any deficiencies were discussed
with the appropriate research assistant and corrections were made prior to the next
experimental session. In addition, all data collection forms were maintained by the
investigator to ensure the privacy o f the subjects.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Screening Questionnaire
The primacy purpose of the screening questionnaire was to evaluate the
financial need o f subjects. Responses to the screening questionnaire indicated that the
eighteen subjects "needed” additional money and that their research eamings would
supplement financial aid and job eamings. Subjects indicated that the money they
earned during the study would be used to pay living expenses and purchase textbooks.
Interobserver Agreement
Interobserver agreement was 100% for each work session. The study was
designed so that researchers worked in pairs and both researchers had to agree on the
number o f correctly made widgets and the amount o f money that was earned during
each session.
Widget Productivity Results
The productivity results are presented in the context o f answeis to research
questions 1 through 6. Widget productivity was analyzed by examining the collective
effort o f each group and by looking at the individual productivity o f all subjects. An
alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests.
Figures 3 through 15 display mean widget productivity data for the six groups
and the eighteen subjects. Because subject 18 dropped out o f the study early in the flat
75
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group condition, the subject’s data were not included in the data analysis. The data
forsubject6, who dropped out o f the study during the first incentive condition, were
included in die flat individual versus flat group comparisons. Subject 6’s data were
eliminated from further analysis. Comparisons o f performance m eans and absolute
and percent changes in productivity across pay systems appear in Tables I through 6.
Research Question 1
The first research question “Does social loafing occur when a group o f three
workers, engaged in a simple construction task, are paid a flat rate?” was answered by
comparing individual productivity during the flat individual condition with productivity
during the flat group condition, irrespective o f group assignment. There is no strong
evidence for the occurrence o f social loafing behavior in the present study. As can be
seen in Figures 3 through 6 (see Table 1 for group means and absolute changes), mean
widget productivity during the flat conditions did vary across the six groups with four
groups producing more widgets during the flat individual condition and two groups
performing better during the flat group condition. Further, it can be seen in Figure 7
(see Figures 8 through 13 for session-to-session data) that productivity also varied
across the seventeen subjects with some generating mote widgets in the individual
condition and some performing better in the group condition. However, the
comparison o f subject means, appearing in Table 2, showed the differences were not
statistically significant, t (13) * .35, p * .73.
The statistical significance test for social loafing was performed after the data
for three subjects (numbers 9,16, and 17) were eliminated. For clarification, the
differences between means were not significant with those three subjects included,
t (16) ” .44, p * .67. Subject 9 (refer to Figure 10) was eliminated because the subject
was late to three sessions during the flat group condition which resulted in few widgets
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Figure 3. Mean Widget Production Across Groups and Pay Systems.

for the session. Therefore, lower productivity during the flat group condition was
unrelated to social loafing. Subjects 16 and 17 (refer to Figure 13) were eliminated
because their low productivity in die flat group condition appears to have little to do
with social loafing. It seems that their minimum performance was a reaction to the 10widget minimum requirement to receive payment for the session.
The best that can be said about social loafing is that some subjects performed
somewhat better during the flat individual condition while others performed somewhat
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Figure 13.

Mean Widget Production for Negatively Accelerating
Group 2 Subjects.
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Figure 14.

Comparison o f Mean Widget Production for All Subjects During the
Individual Incentive and Group Incentive Conditions.

better during the flat group condition. Therefore, the data do not support the contention
o f Latane’ et al. (1979) that social loafing occurs in groups as small as three.
Research Question 2
The second research question, “I f social loafing occurs, what effect will group
monetary incentives have on social loafing behavior when the incentives ate paid as an
equal share o f the group’s total earnings?”, is irrelevant given that social loafing was
not observed.
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□

Individual Incentive
Group Incentive

Figure 15.

Comparison of Mean Widget Production for Groups During the
Individual Incentive and Group Incentive Conditions.

R esearch Question 3

The third research question, “I f social loafing does not occur will equal share
group incentives have any effect on individual performance beyond that observed when
subjects received flat pay while working in a group coaction setting?”, was answered
by comparing die flat group condition with the incentive group condition. The
comparisons were made for groups and individual data. While the data for subjects 9,
16, and 17 were eliminated from the social loafing analysis, they were included in the
analysis o f the incentive pay systems.
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Table 1
Absolute Change in Mean Widget Production Between
the Flat Individual and Flat Group Conditions
Mean
Flat Individual

Group

Mean

Absolute

Flat Group

Change

Linear #1

21.6

23

1.4

Linear #2

17.8

19

1.2

Positively
Accelerating
#1

18.2

16.9

-1.3

Positively
Accelerating
#2

20.1

19.1

-1

Negatively
Accelerating
#1

13.7

13.3

-0.4

Negatively
Accelerating
#2

12.9

10

-2.9

Generally, the answer to research question 3 is that the incentive group pay
-systems generated higher widget productivity than did the flat group pay system. The
differences between means were statistically significant for all three incentive pay
systems. In addition, the evidence supporting the superiority of the incentive group
system over the flat group system is made stronger by the fact that all subjects posted
higher means during the incentive condition. The differences between the subject
means were statistically significant, t (15) 3 7.15, p * .000. The details o f the
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Table 2
Absolute Change in Mean Widget Production Between
the Flat Individual and Flat Group Conditions
for all Subjects

Subject

Mean
Flat Individual

Mean
Flat Group

Absolute
Change

I

24

24.7

0.7

2

18.5

22

3.5

3

21.1

21.8

0.7

4

19

19.8

0.8

5

18

16.8

-1.2

6

15.8

19.8

4

7

19

20

1

8

21.1

20.5

-0.6

9

13

9.8

-3.2

10

19.4

19.1

-0.3

11

22

19.6

-2.4

12

19.2

18

-1.2

13

11.5

15.3

14

17.2

13

-4.2

15

13.2

11.7

-1.5

16

11.3

10

-1.3

17

13

10

-3

3.8
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Table 3
Absolute and Percent Change in Mean Widget Production Between
the Flat Individual and Incentive Group Conditions
Mean
Flat
Group

Group

Mean
Incentive
Group

Absolute
Change

Percent
Change

Linear #1

23

27.8

4.8

21%

Linear #2

19

21.8

2.8

15%

Positively
Accelerating
#1

16.9

19.6

2.7

16%

Positively
Accelerating
#2

19.1

23.9

4.8

25%

Negatively
Accelerating
#1

13.3

22.7

9.4

70%

Negatively
Accelerating
#2

10

20

10

100%

differences are presented in the following discussion and in Figures 4 through 6 and 8
through 13. Tables 3 and 4 list the relevant group and subject means.
Linear Data
For both linear groups (see Figure 4) productivity was significantly better when
subjects worked under the linear group pay system. For group 1 mean widget
productivity increased from 23 to 27.8 and for group 2 the increase was from a mean
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Table 4
Absolute and Percent Change in Widget Production Between
the Flat Individual and Incentive Group Conditions
for All Subjects

Subjects

Mean
Flat
Group

I

24.7

29.3

4.6

19%

2

22

29.2

7.2

33%

3

21.8

24

2.2

10%

4

19.8

22.9

3.1

16%

5

16.8

21

4.2

25%

7

20

22.5

2.5

13%

8

20.5

22.5

2

10%

9

9.8

14.8

5

51%

10

19.1

22.8

3.7

19%

11

19.6

26

6.4

33%

12

18

23

5

28%

13

15.3

27

11.7

76%

14

13

17.6

4.3

33%

15

11.7

22.5

10.8

92%

16

10

19.7

9.7

97%

17

10

20.7

10.7

107%

Mean
Incentive
Group

Absolute
Change

Percent
Change

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TableS
Absolute and Percent Change in Mean Widget Production Between
the Flat Individual and Incentive Individual Conditions
Mean
Flat
Group

Individual

Mean
Incentive
Individual

Absolute
Change

Percent
Change

Linear#!

21.6

25.6

4

19%

Linear #2

17.8

20.8

3

17%

Positively
Accelerating
#1

18.2

23.3

5.1

28%

Positively
Accelerating
#2

20.1

24.2

4.1

20%

Negatively
Accelerating
#1

13.7

25.5

11.8

86%

Negatively
Accelerating
#2

12.9

21.5

8.6

67%

of 19 widgets to a mean o f 21.8. Pooling the two groups, this difference was
statistically significant, t (4) “ S.03, p * .007. Mean productivity improvements for
subjects 1 through S (see Figures 8 and 9) ranged from 2.2 to 7.2 widgets.

PositiysiyAQreletatjng Dm
As can be seen in Figure 5, group l’s productivity improved from a mean of
16.9 during the flat group condition to a mean of 19.6 during the positively accelerating
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Table 6
Absolute and Percent Change in Mean Widget Production Between
the Flat Individual and Incentive Individual Conditions
for All Subjects

Subjects

Mean
Flat
Individual

Mean
Incentive
Individual

Absolute
Change

1

24

28.1

4.1

17%

2

18.5

25.7

7.2

39%

3

21.1

23

1.9

9%

4

19

22.5

3.5

18%

5

18

19

1

6%

7

19

24.3

5.3

28%

8

21.1

25.5

4.4

21%

9

13

18

5

39%

10

19.4

24.3

4.9

25%

11

22

27

5

23%

12

19.2

23.4

4.2

22%

13

11.5

28.9

17.4

151%

14

17.2

19

1.8

11%

15

13.2

25.4

12.2

92%

16

11.3

21

9.7

86%

17

13

22.5

9.5

73%

Percent
Change
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group condition. Similarly, group 2 generated more widgets in the incentive condition,
mean of 19.1 compared to a mean 23.9. Pooling the two groups, this difference was
statistically significant, t (4) * 5.99, p * .002. Mean productivity improvements for
subjects 7 through 12 (see Figures 10 and 11) ranged from 2 to 6.4 widgets.
Ngflatjve|y fo cg lq a tin g Data

The largest productivity improvements occurred for the groups paid under the
negatively accelerating group system (see Figure 6). Group l ’s productivity increased
from a mean o f 13.3 during the flat group condition to a mean o f 22.7 during the
incentive group condition. Group 2’s productivity increased by an average o f 10
widgets improving from a mean o f 10 widgets during the flat condition to a mean of 20
widgets during the incentive condition. Pooling the two groups, this difference was
statistically significant, t (4) - 7.13, g * .002. All subjects (see Figures 12 and 13)
performed better during the incentive condition with improvements ranging from a
mean o f 4.3 to a mean of 11.7 widgets.
Research Question 4
The fourth research question, “If social loafing occurs what effect will
individual monetary incentives have on social loafing behavior when incentive pay is
based solely on individual widget production?”, is irrelevant because social loafing did
not occur.
Research Question 5
The fifth research question, “I f social loafing does not occur will individual
monetary incentives have any effect on individual performance beyond that observed
when subjects received flat pay while working alone?”, was answered by comparing
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productivity during the flat individual and incentive individual conditions. The answer
to the question has two parts. First, all subjects, irrespective o f incentive system
assignment, performed at higher levels when paid under the incentive individual
systems and the differences between means were statistically significant, t (15) • 5.67,
E * .000. Second, the mean differences for each incentive pay system were statistically
significant. Productivity differences are highlighted in the following discussion. Refer
to Tables 5 (group data) and 6 (subject data) for relevant productivity means and
differences.
Linear Data

As is depicted in Figure 4, the linear groups posted similar productivity
improvements. For group 1 mean widget production increased from 21.6 during the
flat condition to 25.6 during the incentive condition. Mean widget productivity for
group 2 increased from 17.8 during the flat condition to 20.8 during the incentive
condition. Pooling the two groups, the difference was statistically significant,
t (4) * 3.31, p ».03. Improvements for the five subjects (see Table 6 and Figures 8
and 9) ranged from a mean of 1 to 7.2 additional widgets when paid individual
incentives.
Positively Accelerating Data
Slightly higher improvements were observed in the positively accelerating
groups (refer to Figure 5). Group l’s performance increased from a mean of 18.2
widgets during the flat condition to a mean o f 23.3 widgets during the incentive
condition. As for group 2, performance improved from a mean of 20.1 in the flat
condition to a mean o f 24.2 in the incentive condition. Pooling the two groups, this
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difference was statistically significant, t (5) * 28.35, g * .000. Subject (see Figures 10
and 11) performance improvements tanged from a mean o f 4.4 to 5.3 widgets.
N egatively A ccelerating D ata

The highest performance increases were observed in the negatively accelerating
groups. For group 1 widget productivity increased from a mean o f 13.7 during the flat
condition to a mean o f 25.5 during the incentive condition. For group 2, mean
productivity increased from 12.9 widgets in the flat condition to 21.5 widgets in the
incentive condition. Pooling the two groups, this difference was statistically significant
t (4 )« 4.01, g * .016. Improvements in subject (see Figures 12 and 13) scores ranged
from a mean o f 1.8 widgets to 17.4 widgets.
Research Question 6
The sixth research question is “Which incentive pay system is better at
managing performance improvements?” This question was included for two reasons.
One, knowing which is generally better, individual or group payouts, is important
when making decisions about the type of incentive payout to use. Two, given choices
between incentive systems, it is useful to know which of the systems has, historically,
been the most effective at improving and controlling performance. To answer the
question in general, individual data was analyzed. The group data were analyzed to
answer the more specific question about each incentive pay system.
Individual versus Group Pavout Comparisons
With respect to the payout arrangement, the productivity for eleven subjects
was better during the individual incentive condition and the productivity for five
subjects was better during the group incentive condition (see Figure 14). When those
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data are analyzed, irrespective of incentive system assignment, the mean differences
between the two incentive conditions are not statistically significant, t (15) * 1.59,
l> * .13.
This conclusion was re-examined in light o f a problem encountered with the
calculation o f group earnings for negatively accelerating group 1. The group payout
was flawed in that subjects actually earned less in the group condition than they did
during the individual condition when they made the same number o f widgets. For
example, 20 widgets under the individual system paid $2.00 while an average o f 20
widgets during the group system paid $1.54. This occurred because o f the incorrect
calculation o f total group earnings.
With the elimination o f the data for subjects 13 through 15 the picture changes.
Eight subjects performed somewhat better during the individual incentive condition
while five subjects performed better during the group incentive condition. The
statistical significance test was rerun and the differences are still not significant,
t (12) * .83, e ” .42. Therefore, there is no strong evidence to suggest that one payout
arrangement is better then the other.
Incentive System Comparisons
A comparison o f the individual and group incentive conditions (refer to Figure
15) for the pay systems revealed the differences to be statistically significant for both
the linear and positively accelerating systems, but in opposite directions. For the linear
system, productivity during the incentive group condition was higher for both groups.
Pooling the two groups, this difference was statistically significant, t (4) - 3.03, e *
.039. Productivity was higher (hiring the incentive individual condition for both
positively accelerating groups and the mean difference was also statistically significant,
t (5) »4.03, p * .010.
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The negatively accelerating data were not included in this analysis which
compares the incentive systems to draw conclusions. In addition to the calculation
problem discussed above, the three subjects (numbers 13, 14, & 15) in negatively
accelerating group 1 indicated on the exit questionnaire that they were displeased with
the lower pay in the group condition. Given that group 1 began in the individual
incentive condition and then went to the group condition, this sequence allows for
direct comparisons o f later earnings in the group condition to earlier earnings in the
individual condition. Therefore, the lower performance o f subjects 13 through 15
during the group condition may have been influenced by the "unfairness** o f the
earnings.
Before leaving the productivity discussion the effects o f intervention
sequencing needs to be examined in order to discount such effects as variables
influencing the observed performance levels. Because o f the necessity to investigate
social loafing behavior within the Latane’ et al. (1979) paradigm, the introduction of
the flat individual and flat group conditions could not be counterbalanced. Therefore, it
is impossible to remove sequence effects from the social loafing data. It is quite
possible that the order o f the flat pay conditions impacted in some way upon the group
performance. The subject data suggest the absence o f sequence effects given that seven
subjects performed better in the group condition whereas ten subjects performed
worse.
As can be seen in Figures 4 through 6, the sequence o f the introduction o f the
incentive conditions was counterbalanced and the group means suggest that
productivity changes were not influenced by the intervention sequence. While linear
group 1 produced more widgets during the second incentive condition, linear group 2
generated more widgets during the first incentive condition. Positively accelerating
group 1 generated fewer widgets during the first incentive condition, whereas group 2
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performed at a lower level during the second incentive condition. The negatively
accelerating groups produced contrasting trends as well, with group I posting better
performance during the first incentive condition and group 2 doing better in the second
incentive condition.
Cost Per Widget Data
Research question 7, “Which monetary incentive system is most cost
effective?’*, was answered by comparing the mean cost per widget during the flat
conditions with the cost during incentive conditions. Figure 16 provides across system
comparisons for the six groups and Tables 7 and 8 display cost per widget and change
Hata

Linear Data

A comparison of the cost per widget during the flat individual condition with
the cost during the incentive individual condition shows that cost during the incentive
condition was minimally higher for group 1 and slightly lower for group I. Cost per
widget increased from $.093 to $. 10 for group 1; whereas the cost decreased from
$.112 to $.10 per widget in the incentive condition for group 2.
The comparisons between the flat group and incentive group systems also
reveal mixed results. For group 1 cost increased from $.087 per widget in the flat
condition to $. 10 per widget in the incentive condition. For group 2 cost per widget
decreased from $.106 in the flat condition to $. 10 in the incentive condition.
These group data simply do not indicate that one linear system is superior over
the other in terms o f cost effectiveness. However, comparisons o f the individual
subject data provide a basis for some general, yet conditional, conclusions about the
cost effectiveness o f the linear systems. If a worker is producing at a fairly high rate
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Cost Per Widget Comparisons Across All Groups and Pay Systems.

under a flat or hourly pay system, as was the case with subject 1 (see Figure 8), the
linear system may not produce any cost savings. For subject 1 mean widget cost was
$.083 under the flat individual condition and $.081 under the group condition. I f the
worker in the real organization is like subject 1, no savings are realized by installing a
linear system. To the contrary, the benefit o f the linear pay system is seen in the
situation where the worker is a low to moderate performer when paid a flat rate, as was
the case with subject 5 (see Figure 9). For subject 5 the cost per widget was $.111
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Table 7
Summary of Mean Widget Production and
G ist Per Widget
Flat

Flat

Incentive

Group

Individual

Group

Individual

Incentive
Group

Linear #1

M -21.6
CPW-.093

M-23
CPW -.087

M-25.6
CPW -.10

M -27.8
CPW*. 10

Linear #2

M -17.8
CPW-.112

M -19
CPW*. 106

M-20.8
CPW-.IO

M*21.8
CPW -.10

Positively
Accelerating
#1

M -18.2
CPW-.109

M -16.9
CPW -.118

M»23.3
CPW*. 109

M -19.6
CPW*. 103

Positively
Accelerating
#2

M -20.1
C P W -10

M*19.1
CPW». 105

M*24.2
CPW*. 112

M -23.9
CPW*. 112

Negatively
Accelerating
#1

M=13.7
CPW*. 146

M-13.3
CPW*. 15

M=25.5
CPW*.088

M -22.7
CPW -.074

Negatively
Accelerating
#2

M -12.9
CPW-.155

M «lCPW».20

M -21.5
CPW-.096

M -20
CPW -.10

during the individual condition and $. 118 during the group condition. In that case, per
widget savings will occur under a linear pay system when the worker makes more
widgets than were made while paid a flat rate.
Positively Accelerating Data
As was the case with the linear pay system, the cost per widget results across
the two positively accelerating groups are not consistent For group 1 the average cost
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Table 8
Comparisons o f Absolute and Percent Change in
Cost Per Widget Between Individual and
Group Incentive Pay Systems

Absolute Change

Percent Change

Absolute Change

Percent Change

Individual

Individual

Group

Group

Incentive Over

Incentive Over

Incentive Over

Incentive Over

Rat Individual

Rat Individual

Rat Group

Rat Group

Linear #1

0.007

8%

0.013

15%

Linear #2

•0.0012

-11%

-0.006

-6%

0%

-0.015

-13%

Group

Positively
Accelerating
#1

0

Positively
Accelerating
#2

0.012

12%

0.007

7%

Negatively
Accelerating
#1

•0.058

-40%

-0.076

-51%

Negatively
Accelerating
#2

•0.059

-38%

-0.1

-100%

per widget o f $.109 was the same for the flat and incentive individual conditions;
whereas the cost increased during the incentive group condition from $. 118 to $. 133.
The results for group 2 show that cost per widget increased in both incentive
conditions. During the flat individual condition cost per widget was $. 10 and it
increased to $. 112 during the incentive condition. Similarly, cost increased from $. 105
in the flat group condition to $.139 during the incentive group condition.
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Based on the current productivity data it is clear that no cost benefits were
derived from the positively accelerating systems. Although, it is possible to gain
savings from the positively accelerating systems when worker productivity under a flat
system is fairly low. For instance, subject 9 produced a mean o f 13 widgets during the
flat individual condition which resulted in a cost per widget o f $. 154. Under the
positively accelerating system 13 widgets would cost $.072 each, a 53% savings. O f
course, the opposite occurs with workers producing at a fairly high rate under a flat pay
system. There were no high performers in the current study so a hypothetical analysis
is appropriate. Given the situation where the worker makes an average o f 25 widgets
under the flat pay system the cost per widget is $.08 compared to a per widget cost of
$. 114 for 25 widgets under the positively accelerating system.
Negatively Accelerating Data
Because o f the problem with the pay calculations for group I, only the data for
group 2 were employed to answer research question 7. Substantial cost reductions
were obtained during the incentive pay conditions when the mean cost per widget
decreased from $.155 during the flat individual condition to $.096 during the incentive
individual condition. Cost per widget decreased from $.20 during the flat group
condition to $. 10 during the incentive group condition.
As was the case with the linear system, the cost benefit o f the negatively
accelerating system is only realized when worker performance under the flat pay
system is low. For example, the worker who makes 15 widgets under the flat pay
system generates a cost per widget of $.133. The same number o f widgets under the
negatively accelerating system costs $.117 each. Greater benefit is also derived when
the low performer under the flat system can be motivated to generate higher
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productivity under the incentive system. For example, a 10-widget increase over the
15 made under the flat pay system will result in a mean widget cost reduction to $.088.
Collectively, the cost per widget data suggest that no one o f the incentive
systems included in this study is superior to any other. While the negatively
accelerating system resulted in substantial cost savings, the data are based on the
performance o f two subjects.
The data also suggest that absolute cost per widget under the incentive system
compared to the cost under the flat system is not always the best indicator o f the value
o f the incentive system. Other factors to consider are the productivity costs associated
with high and low performers when they are paid under flat and incentive systems. It
would seem that, generally, savings will not be derived from incentive systems when
productivity is high under a flat system.
Productivity Data and Cost Per Widget Data
An unplanned research question, “Considering productivity and cost together,
which of the three incentive systems is the best choice?”, was included during the
course of the study. This question was added because organizations are interested in
the relative and absolute value o f the incentive pay system in terms of changes in
productivity and cost. In other words, the question “How much more can I expect to
see in productivity gains and how much is it going to cost me?” is frequently asked
when organizations are considering the merits o f incentives. The data relevant to this
research question can be found in Tables 3 and 5 which list the percent change in
productivity across the flat and incentive conditions and in Tables 7 and 8 which
summarize the cost per widget and productivity data.
A review of the productivity and cost data for each system reveal that a
definitive answer to this question is not supported by the data. Looking at the linear
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groups, it can be seen that group l’s performance during the incentive group condition
increased by 21% while cost increased by 15%. For group 2 productivity increased by
15% while cost decreased by 6%. Turning to the individual condition comparisons,
group 1 posted a 19% improvement in productivity during the incentive individual
condition and cost increased by 8%. While the productivity o f group 2 increased by
17%, cost decreased by 11%.
The positively accelerating systems consistently generated moderate increases in
performance, however the cost per widget changes varied in direction. For group I
productivity during the incentive group condition increased by 16% over the flat group
condition while cost per widget decreased by 13%. Group 2 posted a 16%
productivity increase and a 7% cost increase. Looking at the individual condition
comparisons, for group 1 productivity improved by 28% during the incentive condition
with no change in cost For group 2 productivity increased by 20% while cost
increased by 12%.
The best that can be said is that both the linear and positively accelerating
systems have the potential to generate moderate increases in productivity while
producing decreases in co st A factor which makes the linear system more attractive
than the positively accelerating system is that the organization can reliability predict the
cost o f productivity fluctuations under the linear system.
Off-Task Behaviors
Off-task behaviors were defined as any behavior other than active widget
making. Off-task behaviors observed during the course o f the study were reading
magazines, newspapers and textbooks, studying notes, counting widgets, playing with
pop beads, playing with koosh balls, eating and drinking, getting snacks and drinks
from the break area, fingernail repair and talking. Given that social loafing did not
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occur Guerin’s hypothesis, that the occurrence o f social interaction and other off-task
behaviors makes it impossible to accurately evaluate social loafing, could not be tested.
Questionnaire Results
The initial five questions were designed to assess intervention integrity. Four
subjects indicated that they were aware the purpose o f the study was to investigate the
effects o f monetary incentives on social loafing behavior. Two subjects knew the
purpose prior to starting the study, one subject learned the purpose during the flat
individual condition and one became aware o f the purpose during the incentive group
condition. Subjects did not indicate how they became aware o f the purpose of the
study.
Six o f seventeen subjects indicated they were aware that the experimenters were
tracking individual performance during the flat group condition. This is a particularly
important variable given that individual performance during the group condition may
have been influenced by the potential for individual evaluation. Social loafing
researchers (e.g., Brickneretal., 1986; Harkins, 1987; Williams etal., 1981) have
consistently shown that social loafing behavior is prevented or eliminated by the
introduction o f individual identification and evaluation when people are working
collectively in groups. Three linear subjects, numbers 2 ,3 , and 4, and three negatively
accelerating subjects, numbers 13, 16, and 17, indicated that they were aware of the
individual tracking. Subjects 2 ,3 ,4 , and 13 performed better during the flat group
condition. It is possible that tracking o f individual performance controlled social
loafing behavior for these subjects.
In light of this awareness o f individual performance tracking during the flat
group condition, the significance test for social loafing was recalculated. The data for
subjects 2, 3 ,4 , and 13 were excluded along with the data for subjects 9, 16, and 17,
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which were excluded from the original calculation o f social loafing. The differences
were still statistically insignificant {(9) * .8 2 ,2 * -43.
One question “If this research had been conducted at your place o f work, would
you have approved o f the use o f our research methods to conduct this study?” was
included as a measure o f social validity. Fourteen subjects approved o f the
methodology and two disapproved. The two subjects who indicated they did not
approve of the methodology were members o f the negatively accelerating group 1 who
were affected by the error in calculation o f earnings under the group payout.
Another question “Did this research project seem like a work simulation to
you?” was included to assess the effectiveness of the laboratory simulation. Thirteen
o f the sixteen subjects indicated that the simulated work environment seemed like that
o f a real work place.
Two questions focused on subject preference for working alone (individually)
or collectively (group). Prior to the study, it was hypothesized that individuals who
preferred working alone would produce fewer widgets when working collectively.
Conversely, it was proposed that individuals who preferred to work collectively with
others would perform at a lower level during the individual work conditions. To the
question “Do you generally like working in groups where each group member shares
responsibility for completing the project?” nine subjects responded yes and seven
subjects responded no. Responses were the same to the question “In a work situation
do you prefer to work alone or do you prefer to work with a group o f people?”
Consideration o f the individual responses to these two questions, in the context
o f widget productivity, show that the proposed hypotheses were supported by the
performance data o f eight subjects and not supported by the performance data o f eight
subjects. Starting with the linear groups, subjects 2 ,3 , and 5 indicated they preferred
working in groups. Yet, subject 5’s productivity was lower during the flat group
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condition while subjects 2 and 3 performed better when working in a group. And,
subjects 1 and 4 indicated they preferred working alone but both performed better
during the flat group condition than during the flat individual condition. For the
positively accelerating groups, subjects 7,10, and 12 preferred working in groups yet
their widget productivity was lower during the flat group condition. On the other hand,
subjects 8 ,9 , and 11 indicated they preferred working alone and their performance was
lower during the flat group condition, thereby, supporting the hypotheses. Three
subjects in the negatively accelerating groups support the hypotheses and two fail to
support. Subjects IS and 17 reported a preference for working alone and both subjects
performed at a lower level during the flat group condition; subject 13 preferred to work
collectively and she performed better during the flat group condition; subjects 14 and
16 expressed a preference for working collectively yet both produced fewer widgets
during the flat group condition.
The question “If you were working a full-time job and were not in college how
would you prefer to be paid: flat rate for each hour you work, incentives based on an
equal share o f a group’s total earnings, or incentives based solely on what you
personally produce?” was designed to assess pay system preference. Twelve subjects
preferred being paid incentives delivered contingent upon individual performance only.
Four subjects, all in the negatively accelerating groups, indicated a preference for a pay
system where earnings were based on a flat rate per hour o f work. The preference of
the negatively accelerating subjects 13 through 15 may be more a reflection o f their
dissatisfaction with the incentive group payout then dissatisfaction with group payouts
in general.
Another question associated with pay system preference was "Was there
anything about the incentive pay system you were paid under that was aversive
(unpleasant) to you?” The three negatively accelerating group 1 subjects stated "When

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

we were paid group pay we made a lot more widgets and got worse than when we
made less widgets by ourselves.” These responses were not unexpected given the
calculation error which will be coveted in detail in the discussion section that follows
the results chapter.
The final question was “How did you use die money you earned from this
study?” The responses to this question are important given that prior pay for
performance laboratory simulations have been criticized on the basis that the earnings
were discretionary money. More specifically, the criticism has been that the
productivity of college student subjects is not influenced by the contingencies (e.g.,
need for continued employment, need to produce income to support oneself or family)
that typically affect the "real world” workers. Subjects reported that they used their
earnings to purchase groceries, textbooks and automobile gas, to pay parking fees and
fines, telephone bills, and electric bills, and to cover emergencies associated with trips
home, etc.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The results o f the present study are important for several reasons. First, this is
the first study to investigate the social loafing phenomenon in the context o f a simulated
work place environment The fact that social loafing behavior was not observed does
not significantly diminish the usefulness o f the data because the productivity data in
combination with the self-report data provide clues as to the controlling variables of
social loafing. Second, the study provided strong evidence that individual and group
incentives reliability generate higher performance levels than do flat pay systems.
Finally, the data indicate that performance was differentially affected by the linear and
non-linear incentive pay systems. A detailed treatment o f these conclusions and other
important issues is provided in the following.
The primary objective o f the current study, to determine whether social loafing
behavior occurs in a work place context when people ate engaged in a real work-like
task, was accomplished. A criticism o f social psychology investigations o f social
loafing is that simulated work environments have not been arranged and the resultant
findings are o f little use given that they do not generalize to populations outside the
laboratory. Verbal responses to exit questionnaire items suggest that the laboratory
simulation in the current study was successful in creating an environment subjects
would expect in a real-world work setting.
Another criticism related to the issue of external validity is that many o f the
performance tasks (e.g., shouting rah rah, clapping hands, blowing air into a tube)
employed in the social loafing studies are unlike tasks that people engage in on a regular
112
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basis. Further, the occurrence o f performance decrements when performing such tasks
may have been more a function o f fatigue due to the physical demands o f the task. It is
also quite possible the potential for social disapproval accounted for diminished
performance in the cooction environmental. For example, shouting rah rah as loud as
possible in a context where shouting seems inappropriate could result in low shouting
effort The widget-making task in the current study was designed to overcome this
weakness. Making widgets is much like a piece work activity because it requires
physical effort to combine parts into a finished product.
W hile social loafing was not observed in this study, perhaps the findings have
moved the OBM field closer to identifying the controlling variables of social loafing
behavior in a work environment. Social psychologists (Brickner et al., 1986; Harkins,
1987; K err& Bruun, 1981; Williams etal., 1981) have consistently shown that social
loafing does not occur when there is the potential for individual identification and
evaluation when working coactively in a group. In the current study, four o f the seven
subjects who performed better during the flat group condition reported being aware that
individual performance was being tracked during the flat group condition. Therefore, it
is possible that the potential for individual evaluation controlled social loafing behavior
for those four subjects.
Another controlling variable of social loafing may be the matching o f preference
for certain work settings to the individual (e.g., if the worker prefers to work with
others, place the worker in a work group). Guerin (1993) has suggested that the
restructuring from an individual work setting to a group work setting constitutes a
change in the contingencies to which workers are exposed. For individuals who have a
history o f reinforcement associated with working alone this change results in a loss of
conditioned reinforcers. The absence or withdrawal of conditioned reinforcers might
account for the diminished performance labeled social loafing. If Guerin’s contention
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is correct, then it may well be that individuals who have a history o f reinforcement
associated with working in groups do not loaf in the group context. The self-report
data suggest that work environment preference may impact upon performance. Three
subjects who indicated a preference for working with others performed better during
the flat group condition, whereas, five subjects who indicated a preference for working
alone performed better during the flat individual condition.
Latane’ et al. (1979), in their original social loafing study, drew conclusions
that support Guerin’s notion o f the causes o f social loafing. They concluded that social
loafing was a function o f group contingencies, though they did not identify what those
contingencies looked like. The productivity and self-reports taken together point out
that the influence o f individual history with respect to work setting should be
considered a potential determinant of performance decrements and should be
investigated empirically. An improvement on the current design may lead future
researchers to more useful data with respect to the controlling variables within the
group context The use of a reversal design where subjects go back to performing in
the flat individual condition immediately after the conclusion o f the flat group condition
can more effectively isolate the variables associated with the group context.
It is also possible that in the current study the potential for performance
evaluation and matching of preference for work setting may have combined to control
social loafing behavior. Three ofthe subjects who performed better in the flat group
condition and, subsequently reported they were aware that individual performance was
being tracked during the flat group condition, also reported a preference for working in
groups.
Linked to the social loafing phenomenon is the issue o f teamwork as a solution
for America’s productivity problems. It has been suggested that teamwork may not be
a good solution given the potential for social loafing behavior. The present findings
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provide no empirical evidence that social loafing is, in fact, a threat to the efficacy o f
teamwork interventions. What the data suggest is that both performance
improvements, as was observed in the linear groups, and decrements, as was seen in
the positively and negatively accelerating groups, can occur when people work in
groups o f three.
While it is certainly important to know that performance improvements can be
obtained for small groups paid a flat rate, it is equally important to be aware that
substantial decrements can occur under similar circumstances. Productivity deficits
among the subjects in this study ranged from 2% to 24%. The practical implication of a
sustained productivity loss o f 24% is that the organization will very likely cease to be
viable. Given this scenario, it seems that future investigations o f social loafing should
look at the variables that influence magnitude of decrements.
The second primary objective, to investigate the effects o f linear and non linear
incentive systems with individual and group payouts on performance, was achieved
and the results provide strong empirical support for the superiority o f incentive pay
over flat pay. The three incentive pay systems consistently generated higher levels of
widget production in both the individual and group payouts. This finding was not
unexpected and is consistent with the line of pay for performance research that preceded
this study.
In addition, while the productivity data clearly favor the incentive systems over
the flat pay systems, the data do not support the superiority o f one payout arrangement
over the other. Rather, it seems as though performance improvements can be obtained
with both individual and group payouts. This finding does not support the Agnew et
al. (1991) contention that incentives must be based on individual performance to be
optimally effective.
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The filial general finding with respect to the incentive pay systems was that
performance was differentially effected by the three incentive pay systems. The
differential effects occurred in that (a) the positively accelerating system generated
somewhat higher performance improvements than did the linear system, and (b) the
positively accelerating system generated higher productivity within the individual
payout arrangement while the linear system had a similar effect under the group payout
arrangement This finding is consistent with the Smoot and Duncan (1997) results.
A determination o f the usefulness o f an incentive pay system to an organization
can not be solely based on what the system does to productivity levels. What must also
be considered is the system’s ability to (a) maximize performance while minimizing
cost, (b) to quickly generate performance improvements, and (c) to maintain stable
performance over time. Neither the linear nor the positively accelerating system has an
advantage in terms o f maximizing productivity and minimizing cost Both systems are
equally effective in generating moderate improvements in performance and both have
the potential to generate sufficient productivity gains to effect cost savings over a flat
pay system. As for generating quick improvements in performance, the positively
accelerating system is superior. For both groups there was a clear and substantial
separation between the last data point in the flat pay condition and the first data point in
the first incentive pay condition. On the third criterion, maintaining stable performance
over time, there is no clear advantage gained from either system.
The data for die negatively accelerating groups were not included in the prior
discussion of the best incentive pay system because of the problem with incorrect
calculation o f earnings during the group payout condition. However, even though the
productivity data, in and o f themselves, should be viewed with a "cautious eye,” the
data have instructive value to pay system designers. The verbal responses o f three o f
the subjects assigned to negatively accelerating group 1 suggest that the subjects were
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dissatisfied with the group payout, which is reasonable considering that subjects made
less during the group payout than they did during the individual payout for the same
number o f widgets. However, the difference in mean productivity during the
individual incentive and group incentive conditions was only 2 widgets. More
interestingly, the three subjects performed substantially better during the incentive
group condition then during the flat group condition.
The question that arises from the situation detailed above is “what accounts for
significant improvements in performance when the incentive pay system appears
inequitable to the workers?” Very likely, what has been seen in other incentive studies
(e.g., Dickinson& Gillette, 1993; Frisch & Dickinson, 1990; Smoot & Duncan, 1997)
was observed in the present study. That is, the pay-performance contingency is more
important than the magnitude o f the incentive. To illustrate, while the negatively
f

accelerating subjects’ actual total earnings per session in the group condition were
below what they should have been to maintain equity, the incentive system provided an
opportunity to earn more by making more widgets. No matter how many widgets were
made during the flat pay condition the subject still earned only $2.00. This is not to
suggest that inequitable incentive pay systems should be employed. Rather every
attempt should be made to eliminate such inequities, because, while an inequitable
system may generate higher performance levels in the short term, it will likely generate
long term problems associated with job dissatisfaction, absenteeism and turnover.
The productivity results from the linear and positively accelerating pay systems
also support the notion that the most essential feature of any effective incentive pay
system is that pay and performance are directly linked. When pay is contingent upon
the number o f items an individual produces the presence o f the pay-performance
contingency is a mote powerful determinant o f performance than is the magnitude of
the incentive. This is supported in that the subjects in the current study made more
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widgets in the incentive conditions even though (a) $.10 per widget is not much
money, and (b) each additional widget under the accelerating system did not represent
much o f again in cumulative pay.
There are several additional issues which should be considered when
interpreting the results o f this study. The first has to do with the availability o f
competitive sources o f reinforcement. According to Dickinson and Gillette (1993),
where there are no competitive activities it could be argued that the incentive systems
are effective to some extent because there are no other activities to participate in.
Therefore, subjects spend mote time on task then is typically the case in the work place.
So incentives may increase performance by increasing the amount o f time spent on task
and decreasing the amount o f time spent doing other things. In the current study,
subjects had access to off-task behaviors throughout all experimental conditions,
however, subjects consistently made more widgets during the incentive conditions.
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the isolated effects o f the incentive systems,
not the fact that subjects spent more time on task because there was nothing else to do,
accounted for the performance improvements.
Another, and often cited, criticism of laboratory investigations o f the effects o f
incentive pay systems is that earnings are typically small, in relation to earnings from a
real job. As such those earnings function as discretionary money rather than as job
earnings that are needed for living expenses (as is the case with real job earnings). It is
certainly the case that the individual earnings from this study were not large amounts of
money. Actually, total earnings ranged from $55.56 to $85.01. However, subjects
reported that their earnings were used to cover living expenses and school-related
expenses. Therefore, it should be acknowledged that the earnings may not have
functioned as discretionary funds.
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A third criticism o f empirical investigations o f incentive pay systems is that
incidental perfonnance feedback is always present in all incentive conditions and,
therefore, is a confounding variable. While performance feedback was inherent in the
present study, its effects as a confounding variable were controlled for by allowing
feedback to occur via the same method and at the same frequency across all subjects,
conditions and groups. It still remains that feedback may have interacted with the
incentive system and may have influenced productivity levels. While it may be possible
to tease out the supplemental effects o f feedback through better experimental controls,
doing so is neither practical nor useful because performance feedback exists collaterally
with incentives in the work place.
More valid criticisms associated with external validity concern subject
characteristics and duration o f work sessions. In terms o f subject characteristics, all
subjects were female undergraduates. The absence o f male subjects in the study simply
means that the findings can only be generalized to females. Future research on social
loafing should assure that male and female subjects are included. This is particularly
important given that some social psychology studies have reported social loafing
behavior to be greater in males than females. As for work session duration, the
laboratory simulation would have been improved by making the work session longer
than fifteen minutes. Half-day work sessions would be a more accurate simulation o f a
typical work schedule.
Collectively, the findings from the current study may be valuable information to
OBM practitioners and designers o f incentive pay systems. First, organizations
considering re-engineering to team structures can benefit by installing a linear or non
linear incentive pay system simultaneously with the restructuring. The incentives will
control for performance deficits arising from team work. Second, the linear and non
linear systems are viable interventions for eliminating performance decrements typically
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seen when people are paid under an houriy system, irrespective of whether the
individual is working alone or coactively with others. Third, individual and group
payouts can be equally effective in generating desirable performance improvements.
Fourth, linear and positively accelerating systems are comparable in terms o f generating
performance improvements and controlling costs. Fifth, a positively accelerating
system may be the better choice for organizations that need to, in the short term, gain
market share without concern for cost containment. Sixth, a linear system is likely the
appropriate choice for organizations that need moderate productivity improvements at
predictable cost.
Opportunities for future research ate plentiful. To begin with, direct
replications o f the current study should address the identified. That is, work sessions
need to be longer, male subjects need to be included, the calculation problem with the
negatively accelerating group system must be eliminated and a better system o f covertly
tracking individual performance during group sessions must be found. Although it
looks like social loafing did not occur here, the data do suggest that incentives can
effectively eliminate decrements in coaction. Therefore, it would be useful to continue
direct replications that empirically investigate the effects o f monetary incentives on
social loafing behavior.
Systematic replications may provide some additional research opportunities.
Investigations which simulate the work context and real work-like tasks will provide a
strong basis for generalizing results to the general population. A series o f studies
which employ simple to complex tasks within similar work environments will allow for
the evaluation of task characteristics on social loafing behavior. Also, it will be useful
to incorporate tasks that are actually found in a real work setting, not just simulated
tasks.
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A specific line o f investigation follows from the social loafing theories and
intervention studies. Further investigations o f social loafing should target the
environmental variables identified in the theories: (a) the absence o f systematic
performance feedback, (b) the loss o f conditioned reinfotcets as a function o f being
required to work in a group, (c) the role o f tangible reinforcers in eliminating social
loafing, (d) the lack o f individual identification and evaluation, and (e) failure to
establish individual performance standards for all group members. All o f these
represent variables that are relevant to actual work environments and they may
constitute solutions to the social loafing problem.
Other research opportunities arise from a general weakness in the social loafing
studies. What is currently known about the causes o f social loafing has been derived,
primarily, from self report data. OBM researchers should look for ways to empirically
isolate the controlling variables o f social loafing.
The importance o f continuing this line o f research is exemplified by Sigrid
Glenn’s (1993) comments in her article entitled “ W indows on the 21st century. ”
“Behavior analysis has its own identity and it can build both organizational and
conceptual bridges between itself and other disciplines and organizations...behavior
analysis stands to gain in the long run from such bridge-building attempts’*(p. 145).
Bringing social loafing out o f the social psychology theory-building laboratory and into
the OBM/behavior analysis applied arena will benefit both theoretical orientations that
are being connected by that “bridge,” the science o f behavior and social psychology.
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Delores A. Smoot
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From: Richard Wright. Interim Ch
Re:

HSIRB Projett Number 94-11-24

This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project entitled "The effects of linear and
non-linear incentive pay systems with individual and group payouts on the social psychology
phenomenon of social learning” has been approved under die expedited category of review by
the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board. The conditions and duration of this approval are
specified in the Policies of Western Michigan University. You may now begin to implement the
research as described in the application.
Please note that you must seek specific approval for any changes in this design. You must also f
seek reapproval if the project extends beyond the termination date. In addition if there are any
unanticipated adverse or unanticipated events associated with the conduct of this research, you
should immediately suspend the project and contact the Chair of the HSIRB for consultation.
The Board wishes you success in the pursuit of your research goals.
Approval Termination:
icc

Dec. 8, 1995

Michael, PSY
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Recruitment Script
Hello! My name is Dee Smoot. I am looking for individuals to participate in an
Industrial/Organizational Psychology study designed to investigate worker performance underdifferent
pay conditions. If you decide to participate in the study, your task will be to make "widgets” from
plastic pop beads. A widget consists of 16 beads joined together in a circle.
I am seeking 18 volunteers to participate. Participation will require you to attend 15-minute work
sessions on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays, for a total of 25 sessions. You will be paid for each
session based on your performance (the number of widgets you make during the session), and you will
receive an additional $15.00 for completing the study and another $10.00 for participation in a followup exit interview and debriefing session.
Your assistance is completely voluntary. If you participate, you may leave the study at any time. If
you do leave the study early, you will be paid the amount of money you have earned to the date of
withdrawal. However, you will forfeit the $15.00 for completing the study and the $10.00 for
participation in the exit interview and debriefing session. Your willingness to volunteer for, or
withdraw from the study, will not affect your course grades in this or any other class.
If you would like to participate, please print your name and phone number on the list I am about to
pass out. Also, indicate on the list, by circling the times, the times that you will be available to
participate in the study.
I will be contacting you within the next few days to arrange a time that we can meet and discuss the
study in detail.
T h an k

you for your time!
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Subject Screening Survey
S ubject N um ber_______________
Instructions: Please complete the following questions. A ll th e in fo rm a tio n you
provide w ill rem ain co m p letely con fid en tial.
1.

If you participate in this study, how do you plan to spend the money you earn?

2.

Do you currently hold a job?

3.

If you currently have ajob, how long have you had it? Please indicate your
answer in months/years.

4.

If you currently have a job, how many hours a week do you work at the job?

5.

If you do not currently have ajob, how long has it been since you held ajob?
Please indicate your answer in weeks, months, or years.

6.

Do you receive any financial aid?

7.

Do you know anyone who has signed up to participate in this stucfy? Please list
their names.

8.

If you know anyone who might be interested in signing up for this study,
please refer them to Dee Smoot at 387-4464.

YES

NO

YES

NO
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Western Michigan University, Department o f Psychology
The effects ofLinearand Non-LinearIncentive Pay System s
W ith Individual and Group Payouts
Delores A. Smoot and Jack Michael

Informed Consent for Participation in a Research Study
My name is Dee Smoot and I am a graduate student in the Department o f
Psychology at Western Michigan University. You are being invited to participate in a
research study that will fulfill my dissertation requirements for a Doctor o f Philosophy
degree in Applied Behavior Analysis. The purpose o f this study is to investigate the
effects o f monetary incentives on work performance.
As a participant in this study, you will be required to make "widgets” from
plastic pop beads during 25, 15-minute work sessions. A widget is constructed by
joining 16 beads together in a circle. I have given you a completed widget to look at.
You will work by yourself at an individual work station and with other participants
seated at a large work table. Your own containers o f pop beads will be placed on the
table in front o f you. You will be able to get up, take a break, enjoy other available
activities (i.e., magazines, homework) at any time during the study.
This research involves minimal risk to you as a participant. However, you may
encounter mild stress while performing the widget-making task and mild soreness in
your fingertips may occur from making the widgets in the first few sessions. As
described below, you may withdraw from the study at any time if this occurs, or you
may work on other activities. As in all research, there may be unforeseen risks to the
participant. If an accidental injury occurs, appropriate emergency measures will be
taken; however, no compensation o r treatment will be made available to the subject
except as otherwise stated in this consent form.
You will receive monetary compensation for your participation in this study.
You will be paid in two different ways during the study, hi one condition, the total
amount o f money you will earn will depend upon the number o f widgets you make. In
the other condition, the total amount o f money you will earn w ill depend upon the
number o f widgets made by you and the two other individuals in your group. In
addition, compensation will include a $15.00 bonus for completing the study and
$10.00 for participation in an exit interview and debriefing session. T otal
compensation will include the amount o f money you earn from making widgets plus the
$25.00. The information obtained from tins study may allow business, industry, and
governmental agencies to better design pay systems that satisfy both the organization
and the employee.
All information obtained in this study will remain strictly confidential. When
the results are publicly presented, no one will be able to identify who you are. As a
participant, a code number will be assigned to you and will be used to identify your
data. By signing this consent form, you will be giving permission for data obtained in
this study to be presented in my dissertation and in professional presentations and
publications.
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Your participation in this study Is entirely voluntary. You may withdraw from
the study at any time, without repercussions. I f you do withdraw, you will receive the
amount o f money that you have earned up to the point o f withdrawal, but you will not
receive the $15.00 bonus for completing the study nor w ill you receive the $10.00 for
participation in the exit interview and debriefing session. Your participation in the
study or your withdrawal from the study will not affect your grades in any o f your
courses. During the debriefing session at the end o f the study, the experimenter will
answer any questions and explain how your data w ill help us leam more about
monetary incentives.
I f you have any questions concerning this study, you may contact Dee Smoot at
387-4464. In addition, Dr. Jack Michael, the faculty advisor for die study, may be
contacted at 387-4480. The participants may also contact the Chair, Human Subjects
Institutional Review Board or die Vice President for Research at 387-1893, if questions
or problems arise during the course o f the study.

Your signature below indicates that you understand the above
information and agree to participation in the study.

Participant Signature

Date

Print Participant Name
Please keen the attached

copy

o f this form for vour records.

Reproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Appendix E
Subject Debriefing Script

131

Reproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

132
Debriefing Script
There are two purposes for this debriefing session. First, I want to explain to
you the purpose o f the study you participated in and the role that your participation has
played in helping the field o f Organizational Behavior Management leam more about
individual and group incentive pay systems. Second, participation in scientific research
should provide a learning opportunity for not only the experimenters, but also for the
subjects. Therefore, I will describe the research design and methods we employed and
the research questions we asked. Also, I will show you graphs o f the data you
generated, give our interpretation o fthe data, and explain what the dam mean in terms
o f the research questions we were investigating.
I encourage you to ask questions as I go through the debriefing. I f there is
some aspect of the study that I have not made clear, please feel free to ask for further
clarification.
Purpose O f The Study.
The purpose o f this study has been twofold. First, we investigated the presence
o f social loafing, under simulated work conditions, when subjects were engaged in a
simple production task. Social loafing is defined as the loss o f individual motivation to
perform when working in a group co-action environment when compared to what an
individual produces when hc/she works alone. Second, we evaluated the affects o f
individual and group monetary incentives on social loafing behavior in order to identify
potential intervention strategies to eliminate social loafing behavior in real work
settings. Intervention strategies are methods that scientists use to solve problems.
Rational: Recent efforts to improve productivity in business and industry have
found companies turning to teamwork and the "Total Quality Management” (Deming,
1986; Berry, 1991) for solutions. Annually, over 10,000 people attend Deming’s fourday seminars which emphasize improvements through cooperative efforts. According
to Wellins, Byham, and Wilson (1991), approximately 25% o f all U.S. industries are
experimenting with work teams to improve quality and quantity. And, Robert Reich
(1987) has proclaimed the "Team as Hero” in resurrecting U.S. economic stability.
Interestingly, according to some social psychologists, teamwork may not be a solution
at all, but may actually constitute another source o f productivity problems in the form of
"social loafing” (Harkins & Jackson, 1985; Kerr & Bruun, 1981; Latane, Williams &
Harkins, 1979). Social loafing is said to exist when the level o f an individual’s
performance in an "alone” work setting is greater than the level o f that same
individual’s performance when working in a group co-action work setting. Therefore,
working in teams may result in less productivity and the phenomena o f social loafing
should be o f concern to the field o f management and organizational behavior
management. However, die literature in neither field gives any attention to teamwork
and social loafing. In addition, the efforts by social psychologists to isolate the
variables that account for the social loafing effect have been restricted to laboratory
studies that have not simulated real work environments. Thus, there is no evidence that
social loafing exists in the real world. However, o f even greater concern is the fact that
there is no evidence suggesting that social loafing does not exist; if it does exist, social
psychology has not provided ways to change social loafing behavior.
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The search for solutions to productivity problems has not been restricted to the concept
o f teamwork. Organizations are increasingly turning to group monetary incentive
programs such as profit sharing and gain sharing (Blinder, 1990; Lawler, 1990; Perry,
1988; Skryzcld, 1987; Weitzman & Kruse, 1990). However, Agnew, Dickinson,
Acker and Cronin (1992) suggest such systems are relatively ineffective at changing
organizational behavior because they violate a basic behavioral principle relevant to payfor-performance: to derive the greatest benefit from monetary incentive systems money
should be delivered contingent upon clearly defined, individual behavior as soon after
the behavior as possible. Because group co-action is inherent in organizations
employing group monetary incentive programs, the ineffectiveness o f such programs
may also be a function o f social loafing effect. Yet, it is also possible that monetary
incentives used with small groups (i.e. N*3 proposed in the current study) may prove
to be effective at eliminating social loafing effects and, thereby, making teamwork in
small groups a viable solution to productivity problems. In addition, there is
considerable evidence that individual monetary incentive systems, conforming to the
parameters outlined by Agnew et al. (1992), consistently improve productivity in the
laboratory and in applied settings (for a review, see Dickinson & Gillette, 1993). Yet,
none o f these studies have investigated the effects on individual monetary incentives on
social loafing behaviors.
Given the current trend o f business and industry toward team work and the use
of group incentive programs, the potential that social loafing exists in the real world,
and the fact that monetary incentives increase productivity, an empirical investigation o f
the social loafing phenomenon and the effects o f monetary incentives on social loafing
is a logical step. The current study will provide valuable information to designers of
incentive pay systems and to organizations with team cultures.
Your Role In This Study:
Empirical investigation o f real world work problems necessitates that the
subjects who participate in the research be like the individuals who actually hold full
time jobs in the real world. Undergraduate students are very much like others who
have full-time jobs. Typically, you juggle a part time job and many other work-like
activities such as repetitive class schedules and assignment demands, positions on
sporting teams and in organizations. Therefore, you have played an important role in
helping us to simulate a teal world work setting in the confines o f an experimental
laboratory.
How The Study Was Designed and Conducted:
Experimental Questions. Seven research questions were investigated in this
study. First, does social loafing occur when a group of 3 workers engaged in a simple
construction task are paid a flat, hourly-type rate? Second, if social loafing occurs,
what effect will group monetary incentives have on social loafing when the incentives
are paid as an equal-share o f the group’s total earnings? Third, if social loafing does
not occur will equal-share group incentives have any effect on individual performance
beyond that observed when subjects received flat pay while working alone and in a
group co-action setting? Fourth, if social loafing occurs what effect will individual
monetary incentives have on social loafing behavior when incentive pay is based on
individual widget production? Fifth, if social loafing does not occur will individual
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incentives have any effect on individual performance beyond that observed when
subjects received flat pay while working alone and in a group co-action setting? Sixth,
which monetary incentive system, linear (group equal-share or individual payout),
positive acceleration (group equal-share or individual payout), negative acceleration
(group equal-share or individual payout), is better at managing perform ance
improvements? Seventh, which monetary incentive system is most cost effective?
R esearch D esign. A within-subject, m ultiple baseline design with
counterbalancing was used to assess the independent variables. The within-subject
m anipulation consisted o f exposing each o f you to all levels o f the independent
variables and tracking your performance during all the experimental conditions. For
example, you started working by yourself and received $2.00 for die work session;
next you worked with 2 others and received $2.00 for the session; then you worked
with those same people and were paid either individual incentives or group incentives.
So each o f you were exposed to all pay systems and to the individual and group work
conditions. The multiple baseline configuration was included to more accurately assess
the effects o f the incentive pay systems on social loafing behavior. Multiple baseline
means that you have two identical groups running at the same time but you introduce
the pay systems at different times, performance changes after, and not prior to the
introduction o f a pay system, and the change occurs for both groups at different times,
then the evidence supporting the effects o f the pay system are more compelling.
Counterbalancing occurred in that the sequence o f die introduction o f the incentive pay
phases across the six groups was reversed. This was done to discount any sequencing
effects as the causes oif productivity changes under the incentive systems.
Simulation. Because the overall purpose o f this study was to investigate the
existence o f social loafing in the real world and the effects o f monetary incentives in
such settings, the laboratory environment was designed to resemble, as much as
possible given the physical and budgetary constraints o f academic research, the real
world o f work. First, the production task o f constructing widgets was not unlike piece
work. Second, if you arrived to work late you were permitted to enter the work
session and you were not systematically penalized for tardiness nor were you given
extra time. However, there was a naturally occurring penalty in that people arriving late
typically produced fewer widgets, thereby, earning less pay. In the group flat pay and
incentive conditions, tardiness may have translated to lower overall group productivity
and less for each group member. Third, in a real work setting it is not unusual to find
competitive sources o f reinforcement for off-task behaviors such as social interaction
with co-workers, talking on the telephone, reading magazines, and eating. Therefore,
you were prohibited from engaging in alternative activities and were permitted to bring
items, such as reading materials and food, to work sessions. In addition, coffee and
snacks, reading materials and playing cards were made available to you. Fourth, you
were asked to sign a form verifying the number o f widgets you produced and the
amount earned per work session. This verification served much the same purpose as
an employee's signature on a time card.
Dependent Variable. The primary dependent variable was the number of
correctly produced widgets in each work session w ithin each pay condition. A
secondary dependent variable was the cost-per-widget in each pay condition.
Independent V ariable. The independent variables were the work setting
(individual and group) and the system by which workers were paid. The work setting
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variable consisted o f you working alone and in a group co-action environment. The
pay system variable consisted o f four pay systems, one flat rate system and three
incentive pay systems - linear, positive acceleration and negative acceleration, and two
payout plans - individual and group equal-share.
Flat Phv. You were paid $2.00 per work session in Phase A (individual work
setting), provided you produced at least 10 correct widgets, and Phase B (group co
action setting), provided your group’s total productivity was equal to 10 widgets per
group member. Flat pay o f $2.00 per session during the initial two phases, which
were compared to determine if social loafing occurred, was used to hold pay constant
between the two phases and among subjects. The existence o f differential pay in either
phase would likely confound the performance data and essentially render the measures
o f social loafing behaviors useless.
Linear Incentive Pay System. In Phases C and D, subjects in two groups were
paid under the linear incentive pay system and received .10 for each correctly
constructed widget. In the Phase C group co-action setting, you were paid an equal
share o f your group’s total earnings provided that the group’s total productivity was
equal to at least 10 widgets per subject. In the Phase D group co-action setting,
individual widget productivity was reported overtly and each o f you received incentive
pay based on the number o f widgets you actually produced, provided you made at least
10 widgets, rather than being paid an equal-share of the group’s total earnings.
Positive Acceleration Pay System. Subjects in two other groups were paid
under the positive acceleration pay system during Phases C and D. The positive
acceleration pay curve is based on gradual increases in the value of each additional
widget and, therefore, you were paid somewhat more for each additional widget you
produced. In the Phase C group co-action setting, you were paid an equal share of the
group's total earnings provided that the total group productivity equaled at least 10
widgets per subject. In the Phase D group co-action setting, individual widget
productivity was reported overtly and each o f you received incentive pay based on die
number of widgets you actually produced provided you made at least 10 widgets.
Negative Acceleration Pav System. Subjects in the last two groups were paid
under the negative acceleration pay system during Phases C and D. The negative
acceleration pay curve is based on gradual decreases in the value of each additional
widget and, tiierefore, you were paid somewhat less for each additional widget they
produce. In the Phase C group co-action setting, you were paid an equal share of the
group’s total earnings provided that total group productivity equaled at least 10 widgets
per subject. In the Phase D group co-action setting group, individual widget
productivity was reported and each subject was paid incentives equal to the total
number o f widgets site actually produced.
Experimental Controls. It is important to built controls into your research so
that other variables (other things that may be happening during the study) do not
confound (interfere) your research and, thereby, contaminate the data you collect and
render the conclusions you draw from those data useless. So, we did a number o f
things to control for confounding variables. Fiist, we read all o f you the same
instructions and gave the same demonstration on how to correctly construct a widget.
Second, you were read standard instructions before each work session. Third,
research assistants worked in teams so that one could verily the accuracy o f the other
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assistant’s behavior when counting how many widgets you made and when c a lc u la tin g
how much money you had earned. Fourth, we had you report to work at the same time
each day and work for the same amount o f time during each session. Fifth, we timed
your work sessions with a calibrated watch. Sixth, we did not give you any
information about the study which could in any way influence how many widgets you
made. Seventh, all subjects were treated the same in terms o f working space, comfort,
access to breaks and refreshments, and amount of construction materials. Eight,
subjects were all screened using the same criteria which made each o f you essential
equal coming into the study. Ninth, research assistants received training in how to
implement the independent variables and how to collect and record data correctly and
with accuracy. This is important for intervention integrity and interobserver agreement.
Intervention integrity simply means that the assistants introduced the experimental
conditions the same across all subjects and groups and they introduced the intervention
as it was intended to be. Interobserver agreement means that both assistants on the
team counted the same number o f widgets and calculated the same amount o f pay for
the session.
Measuring Your Productivity. Well you know that we tracked how many
widgets each o f you made when you were working alone in the flat pay condition and
when you received individual incentive pay, but we also tracked you individual
productivity when you were working in the group conditions. We did this by colorcoding the white pop beads that you used. We put a dot o f airplane paint inside tire pop
bead hole. That way, when we took the widgets apart we could easily see which ones
each of you had made. We did this because one o f the theories about social loafing
behavior is that when people work in group co-action settings they are more susceptible
to loafing (putting out less work) when their productivity can not be identified, hi other
words, if we could not tell how many o f the widgets produced by your group were
yours, then you would be more likely to loaf. So, we had all members o f the group
throw their widgets in a pile in the middle o f the table and had all o f you use the same
colored beads. That way it was more probable that you would believe your individual
performance was not being tracked.
Data Analysis. Evaluation o f the effects of the independent variables was
accomplished through visual analysis o f widget productivity data graphs and
comparison o f data derived from simple mathematical calculations. The primary units
o f comparison were the number o f widgets produced per work session and phasic, and
cost-per-widget per work session and phase. In addition, to more completely assess
treatment effects, change data will also be analyzed.
Visual Analysis. Your individual productivity per work session and the
productivity o f your group per work session was tracked using computer graphs.
Visual analysis o f data graphs was employed to evaluate performance trends in terms o f
stability, variability and overall productivity within each phase, and to compare widget
productivity levels per work session across interventions, groups, and individuals. In
the group graphs, widget productivity data for the three subjects was collapsed into
group data and presented as mean productivity for each work session. The individual
performance graphs contain absolute values o f widget production per work session.
The analysis o f individual data included presentation o f data for all subjects and the
identification o f typical and atypical individual productivity. Typical individual
productivity was defined as productivity trends which closely track the productivity
curve of the group to which the subject was assigned. Atypical individual productivity
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was defined as productivity trends which do not closely tract the productivity curve of
the group to which the subject was assigned.
Simple Calculations. Three simple mathematical calculations were performed to
facilitate comparisons o f levels o f the independent variable within* and between-groups
and subjects. The data allowed the seven research questions to be answered more
comprehensively. First, an overall mean for productivity in each phase, by group and
individual worker, was calculated. Second, the percent o f change in mean
productivity, when subjects are changed from one intervention phase to another, was
calculated for each phase, by group and individual worker. For example, the difference
between the overall mean for Phase A and Phase B was calculated as a percentage and
presented as "percent o f change" data. The overall means and percent o f change data
was compared to assess the effects o f the levels o f the independent variables on
productivity levels within each payout condition. Finally, to understand the broader
impact o f the flat and incentive pay systems, a simple cost-benefit analysis was
conducted. The cost-per-widget (CPW) in all phases and the percent o f change in
CPW was calculated for group and individual productivity.
M anipulation Check and Supplemental Data . A n exit questionnaire (see
Appendix H) was administered to each of you. The purpose o f the questionnaire was
to determine whether subjects were aware o f the purpose o f the study and the covert
tracking o f individual performance. If subjects were aware, then any changes in
productivity during the intervention phases cannot be attributed, with confidence, solely
to the independent variable(s) o f interest While such self-report data cannot be used as
conclusive evidence, it can augment the empirical data.
Presentation O f The Data and Conclusions:
Transparencies o f the individual and group data graphs were be used to present
the data in terms o f mean widgets produced per work session, per pay system, and per
experimental condition and in terms o f stability and productivity trends. The data will
be interpreted and conclusions with respect to the seven research questions will be
offered.
Question and Answer Period:
Are there any questions? Are there any parts o f the study which you need more
information about?

Concluding Comments;
I would like to take this opportunity to, once again, thank you for participating
in this study. You have played a key role in helping us to understand the variables that
cause and maintain social loafing behavior in a simulated work environment. And, the
results'of this study have told us more about the characteristics o f the optimal individual
and group monetary incentive pay system. This study has been funded by Aubrey
Daniels & Associates Consulting, Tucker, Georgia.
This study constitutes my doctoral dissertation and will be written up and
presented during my oral defense sometime next year. The oral defense will be
publicized throughout the university, hi addition, I plan to present this data at the
annual convention o f the Association for Applied Behavior Analysis in May, 199S.
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Instructions. Please circle only one answer to each of the following questions.

1.

Before beginning the first work session were you aware that the purpose o f this
research was to study the effects o f monetary incentives on social loading?
Yes

2.

I f you were not aware o f the purpose o f this research before you began the first
work session, did you leam o f its specific purpose while the study was being
conducted?
Yes

3.

No

No

I f you answered "Yes’*to question 2 above, please indicate when you became
aware o f the purpose.
a. When you worked alone and received $2.00 per work session.
b. When you worked in a group and received $2.00 per work session.
c. When you worked in a group and received an equal-share o f the total
group’s incentive earnings.
d. When you worked in a group and received pay equal to the number o f
widgets you personally made.

4.

When you were working in a group and receiving $2.00 per work session,
were you aware that the experimenters were keeping track o f the number o f
widgets that you personally made?
Yes

5.

When you were working in a group and receiving an equal share o f the group’s
total incentive earnings, were you aware that the experimenters were keeping
track of the number o f widgets that you personally made?
Yes

6.

No

No

I f this research had been conducted at your place o f work, would you have
approved o f the use o f our research methods to conduct this study?
Yes

No

Yes, with some changes

7.

I f you answered "Yes, with some changes" in question 6, please list the
changes that would make this study more acceptable to you and your
coworkers.

8.

Do you generally like working in groups where each group member shares
responsibility for completing the project?
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Yes
9.

Did this research project seem like a work simulation to you? In other words,
did being required to show up for work on 25 days, working for die fifteen
minute sessions, having to make at least 10 widgets to get paid, and getting paid
on a weekly bads (for die most part) seem like a real job?
Yes

10.

No

No

If you were working a fiill-time job and were not in college, how would you
prefer to be paid?
a. A flat rate for each hour you work.
b. Incentives based on an equal share o f a group’s total earnings
c. Incentives based solely on what you personally produce

11.

In a work situation do you prefer to work alone (like the individual work setting
in this research) or do you prefer to work with a group o f people (like the group
work setting in this research)?
Group

12.

Alone

Undecided

When you were working in the group, equal-share incentive pay condition,
some group members did not make as many widgets as others made. Yet,
those members who make less widgets still got paid as much as those members
who made more widgets. How did you feel about this?

13.

Was there anything about the incentive pay system you were paid under that
was aversive (unpleasant) to you?

14.

How did you use the money you earned from this study?

15.

If you have not used the money you earned from this study yet, how do you
plan to use the money?
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fay System Scales for the Three Incentive Pav Systems
Number o f
Widgets

Linear

Negatively
Accelerating

Positively
Accelerating

l
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

S0.10
$030
$030
$0.40
$030
$0.60
$0.70
$0.80
$050
S1.00
$1.10
$130
$130
$1.40
$130
$1.60
S1.70
$1.80
$1.90
$2.00
$2.10
$230
$230
$2.40
$230
$2.60
$2.70
S2.80
S2.90
$3.00
$3.10
$330
$330
$3.40
$330
$3.60
$3.70
$3.80
$3.90
$4.00

$038
$0.49
S0.67
$0.82
S0.95
$1.07
S1.17
$137
S135
$1.43
$131
$138
$1.64
Sl.70
Sl.76
$1.81
$1.86
$1.91
S156
S2.00
$2.04
S2.08
$2.12
$2.16
$230
S233
$236
$230
$233
$236
$239
S2.42
$2.45
$2.47
$230
$233
$235
S238
$2.60
$2.62

$0.04
$0.08
$0.12
$0.17
$032
$037
$031
$037
$0.45
$035
$0.67
$0.80
$0.93
$1.07
$131
$136
$131
$1.67
$1.83
$2.00
$2.17
S234
$231
$2.68
S2.86
$2.94
$3.12
$331
$330
$3.69
$3.89
$4.09
$439
$430
$4.71
$4.92
$534
$5.46
S5.68
$5.91
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Today, you will be paid $2.00 foe the work session as long as you make at least 10 correct widgets. If
you do not make at least 10 correct widgets, you will not receive any pay for the work session.

QRQUP FLAT
Today, you will each be paid $2.00 for the work session as long as the group’s total widget
productivity equals at least 10 cornet widgets per worker. So, the group’s total widget productivity
must be at least 30 comet widgets for any subject to be paid for the work session. If the group does
not produce at least 30 correct widgets, no worker will be paid for the work session.

INDIVIDUAL POSITIVELY ACCELERATING
Today, you will be paid based on the number of widgets that you make during the session. Each
additional widget will be worth somewhat mote than the previous widget You must make at least 10
correct widgets in order to receive any pay for the work session. If you do not make at least 10 correct
widgets, you will not be paid for the work session.

GROUP POSITIVELY ACCELERATING
Today, pay will be earned based on the number of widgets made during the session. Each additional
widget will be worth somewhat mote than the previous widget Each worker will receive an equalshare of the group’s total earnings as long as the group’s total widget productivity equals at least 10
correct widgets per worker. So the group’s total widget productivity must be at least 30 correct widgets
for any subject to be paid for the work session. If the group does not produce at least 30 correct
widgets, no worker will be paid for the work session.

INDIVIDUAL NEGATIVELY ACCELERATING
Today, you will be paid based on the number of widgets that you make during the session. Each
additional widget will be worth somewhat less than the previous widget. You must make at least 10
correct widgets in order to receive any pay for the work session. If you do not make at least 10 correct
widgets, you will not be paid for the work session.

GROUP NEGATIVELY ACCELERATING
Today, pay will be earned based on the number of widgets made during the session. Each additional
widget will be worth somewhat less than the previous widget Each worker will receive an equalshare of the group’s total earnings as long as the group’s total widget productivity equals at least 10
correct widgets per worker. So the group’s total widget productivity must be at least 30 correct widgets
for any subject to be paid for the work session. If the group does not produce at least 30 correct
widgets, no worker w ill be paid for the work sessioa.

INDIVIDUAL LINEAR
Today, you will be paid $ .10 for each widget that you make. You must make at least 10 correct
widgets in order to receive any pay for the work session. If you do not make at least 10 correct
widgets, you will not be paid for the work session.
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GROUP LINEAR
Today, each widget produced will be worth S .10. Each worker will receive an equal-ahare of the
group’s total earnings as long as the group’s total widget productivity equals at least 10 correct widgets
per worker. So the group’s total widget productivity must be at least 30 correct widgets for any subject
to be paid for the work session. If the group does not produce at least 30 correct widgets, no worker
will be paid for the work session.
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Group Productivity and Pav Record
Work Session Day and D ate:______________ Group Num ber_____
Total Number Cotrect Widgets Produced During This Work
Session:_________________________
Total Group Earnings For This Work Session:___________________
Group Member Name:

Amount Earned:

Signature:

1 ._________________________________________________________________

2 . ___________________________________________________________

3 .______________________________________________________

5.
6.

Experimenter Name:

Signature:

a.______________
b . ______________
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Individual Productivity and Pay Record
Group Member Name:_________________________________________
Work Session Day and D ate:_______________________ Group Num ber
Total Number o f Correct Widgets Produced During This Work Session:__
Total Earnings For This Work Session:____________________________
Group Member Signature:_______________ ;______________________

Experimenter Name:

Signature:

a.
b.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Appendix K
Pay Summary Form

150

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

151

Pay Summary form
Group Member Name:_______________________Date:________________
Group N um ber________________ Pay Period:_____________ T o _______

Total Pay Earned For This Pay Period:____________ Signature:__________

Experimenter Name:

Signature:

a. _____________________________________________________________
b . ____________________________________________________________
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off-Ta$kiktavforc Ptaflvtffon.F9Tro
Subject Name:_________________________ Day and Date:_____________
Group N um ber_________ Pay Condition At Time O f Observations:_______
Phase At Time O f Observation:____________Session # In That Phase:_____
Provide a behavioral description o f the off-task behavior and the frequency and
duration of the behavior
1._________________________________________________________________________

2.

3.

4.

Experimenter Name:

Signature:

a. ____________________________________________________________
b . ____________________________________________________________
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Total f-arpings Available to Subjects
R at
Individual

R at
Group

Incentive
Individual

Incentive
Group

Total

Linear
1 thru 3

$12.00

$14.00

$28.00

$20.00

$74.00

4thu 6

$10.00

$10.00

$28.00

$32.00

$80.00

Pos. Acc.
7 thru 9

$14.00

$10.00

$4137

$47.28

$112.65

10 thru 12'

$10.00

$16.00

$4137

$29.55

$96.92

Neg. Acc.
13 thru 15

$10.00

$12.00

$20.96

$15.72

$58.68

16 thru 18

$12.00

$12.00

$1834

$15.72

$58.06

Subject
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Subject M onetary E arnings Under Each Pav System andTotal F am in p s
Subject

Hat
Individual

H at
Group

Linear
1

$12.00

$14.00

$16.90

$11.00

$25.00

$78.97

2

$8.00

$10.00

$15.40

$13.97

$25.00

$72.37

3

$12.00

$12.00

$14.00

$11.07

$25.00

$73.87

4

$10.00

$10.00

$15.60

$17.48

$25.00

$78.13

5

$10.00

$8.00

$9.40

$13.13

$25.00

$65.53

6
$10.00
Pos. Acc.
7
$14.00

$8.00

$4.28

$0.00

$0.00

$22.28

$10.00

$18.95

$15.71

$25.00

$83.66

Incentive Incentive Bonus
Total
Individual Group Payment Earnings

8

$12.00

$8.00

$17.43

$10.51

$25.00

$72.94

9

$10.00

$8.00

$6.71

$15.71

$25.00

$65.42

10

$10.00

$14.00

$19.03

$16.79

$25.00

$84.82

U

$8.00

$16.00

$19.82

$16.19

$25.00

$85.01

$10.00
12
Neg. Acc.
13
$8.00

$14.00

$18.03

$16.19

$25.00

$83.79

$12.00

$16.24

$10.14

$25.00

$71.88

14

$10.00

$12.00

$13.68

$10.14

$25.00

$68.83

15

$10.00

$12.00

$17.66

$10.14

$25.00

$74.80

16

$12.00

$12.00

$14.24

$10.28

$25.00

$67.40

17

$8.00

$8.00

$10.44

$4.12

$25.00

$55.56

18

$8.00

$4.00

$0.00

$0.00

$0.00

$12.00
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